Every few months, someone in the superannuation industry declares that Australians now “need” around A$1 million to retire comfortably. It’s a big, scary number.
But consumer advocates say most people can retire with far less.
Independent estimates suggest something closer to $322,000 is enough for many retirees who own their own home. So who’s right – and what assumptions drive these wildly different targets?
It’s easy to put off thinking about superannuation when retirement is years away. In this five-part series, we ask top experts to explain how to sort your super in a few simple steps, avoid greenwashing, and set goals for retirement.
What the two key benchmarks say
Two key organisations publish retirement benchmarks in Australia, and they paint very different pictures.
The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA), the lobby group for the super industry, publishes two lifestyle options in its 2026 Retirement Standard. This was recently updated to reflect a higher cost of living:
Modest retirement: Covers the basics – a budget car, basic private health insurance, one domestic holiday a year. This costs around $35,503 a year for a single homeowner, and the age pension (the regular government payment available to eligible retirees aged 67+) covers most of it. You’d only need around $110,000 in super.
Comfortable retirement: Includes top-level private health insurance, a newer car, regular dining out, and overseas travel. ASFA puts this at around $54,240 a year for a single homeowner, requiring roughly $630,000 in super. For couples, it’s about $77,375 a year, needing around $730,000.
These are significant sums – but well below $1 million.
Then there’s Super Consumers Australia, an independent consumer group that recommends a substantially lower amount.
Rather than imagining a lifestyle, the consumer group uses actual Australian Bureau of Statistics data on what retirees really spend. Its headline finding: a typical single retiree spending at the middle level out of three options needs just $322,000 in super.
Remember, retirees don’t have work-related expenses and they also enjoy a range of discounts on things such as council rates, electricity and medicines, which can really add up.
Part of the difference is the industry body, ASFA, has an interest in encouraging people to contribute more to their super. Its “comfortable” standard is higher than most Australians’ standard of living while working.
Why the numbers differ
The gap comes down to what each benchmark is measuring.
ASFA describes an aspirational lifestyle. Super Consumers describes what real retirees actually spend.
The age pension does a lot of the heavy lifting either way. At Super Consumers’ medium spending level, about 67% of retirement income comes from the age pension, and the remainder from your super balance.
But here’s a crucial new factor: the age pension isn’t keeping up with what retirees actually spend money on.
While the pension is indexed to inflation, retirees’ major expenses – insurance, rates, utilities, health care and food – have been rising faster than general consumer prices.
That means retirees who rely heavily on the pension are seeing more financial pressure than the headline inflation numbers suggest.
There’s a housing catch
Here’s the crucial fine print: every one of these benchmarks assumes you own your home outright when you retire.
That assumption is becoming shaky. Research shows the share of Australians aged 55–64 still carrying mortgage debt has tripled since 1990, and the average debt for that age group now exceeds $230,000. More than one in three Millennials expect to retire with a mortgage still running.
The ASFA budgets are built on the assumption of full home ownership. That means they do not include rent, mortgage repayments or major housing costs.
If you’re renting or carrying a mortgage into retirement, the required super balance can rise dramatically. ASFA estimates renters need $340,000–385,000 for a modest lifestyle – more than a homeowner needs for a comfortable one.
Super Consumers Australia presents a similar gap, estimating that a renter requires about $659,000 in superannuation, compared with only $322,000 for a homeowner.
With more people retiring with mortgage debt today than previous generations, both key benchmarks may underestimate housing-related stress for future retirees.
Planning for retirement starts with a realistic budget of what you will spend.Kampus/Pexels
The gender gap in retirement
Retirement targets are often discussed as if everyone starts from the same position. They don’t.
Australian women retire with about 25% less super than men. The gender pay gap (currently around 21%) compounds over a working life into a much larger retirement savings gap. Women also live longer on average, meaning their money needs to stretch further.
The government began paying super on parental leave in July 2025 – a meaningful step forward. But the gap remains significant.
What this means for you
There’s no single right number. But ask yourself these questions before chasing any benchmark:
will you own your home outright?
do you want to travel or are you a homebody?
are you planning for one income or two?
The gap between ASFA comfortable and Super Consumers medium is $8,497 a year in spending – but nearly $308,000 in required super. That difference is almost entirely lifestyle choice.
For a personalised estimate, the free MoneySmart Retirement Planner is a good starting point, or call the government’s free Financial Information Service on 132 300.
The $1 million figure isn’t evidence-based for most Australians. But the lower benchmarks all carry the same caveat: they assume you’re a homeowner. As more people retire with debt or as renters, even those more modest numbers may understate what you actually need.
Disclaimer: This article provides general information only and is not intended as financial advice.
This time six years ago, as officials prepared to move New Zealand into lockdown, the public was suddenly introduced to the complex and somewhat bewildering world of pandemic modelling.
These highly mathematical models mapped out how COVID-19 might spread, projecting potential infections, hospitalisations and deaths in stark scenarios, sometimes making for alarming news headlines.
But the models told us much less about the wider economic and social consequences of the decisions being made in those crisis weeks and months.
As the recently released Phase Two report of the Royal Commission on COVID-19 concluded, New Zealand’s pandemic response was ultimately effective.
Yet it also acknowledged the significant social and economic impacts of both the virus and the response – including strains on trust and social cohesion – and singled out areas for improvement.
That included the need for better modelling, data and frameworks to help decision-makers weigh those society-wide impacts more effectively.
Notably, the inquiry recommended a new strategic function – based in either the Treasury or the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet – to help guide New Zealand through the next pandemic.
It might be asked how such a function could sit outside the Ministry of Health, which was central to the initial COVID-19 response.
But in these emergencies, decision-makers shouldn’t be choosing between health and the economy. Pandemics affect both – and understanding the full impacts requires all perspectives.
If the inquiry made one thing resoundingly clear, it is that in the next pandemic – and there will be one – leaders must be able to make faster, better informed calls.
So, what if, next time, New Zealand had the modelling tools it needed to weigh up all the potential impacts at once?
A new pandemic model?
The British statistician George Box famously said that “all models are wrong, but some are useful”.
In essence, models may never perfectly capture the complexities of the real world, but they remain valuable tools for decision-making and prediction.
Pandemic responses are largely informed by epidemiological models, which help us understand how disease spreads through populations, and which simulate the impact of different control measures. But they also have limitations, including the difficulty of capturing human behaviour.
During COVID-19 and earlier events, these models were typically developed separately from economic modelling, each serving distinct purposes. Increasingly, however, there is recognition that integrating these approaches can provide a more complete picture.
Reflecting this shift, the UK-based Institute for Government has examined the benefits and challenges of so-called “epi-econ” models, which combine epidemiological and economic analysis.
Rather than simply assessing cost-effectiveness, these more sophisticated models aim to capture both the public health and broader economic impacts of policies such as lockdowns, border closures, vaccination programmes and wage subsidies.
They can simulate how such measures may affect infections, hospitalisations and deaths, as well as their possible impacts on inflation, employment and economic growth.
They can also take both short and long-term perspectives, capturing the complex, dynamic interactions between public health crises, the interventions used to manage them and their broader macroeconomic consequences.
Such modelling can take several forms. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, for instance, simulate how households, firms, government and markets interact across the economy.
They have been recently used to assess the impacts of tariffs introduced by US President Donald Trump; earlier, they helped New Zealand’s government model the economic impacts of fuel outage scenarios.
To be useful in a pandemic, however, these models need to be “dynamic” – or able to track how conditions and intersections within the model evolve over time rather than offering a static snapshot.
Dynamic CGE models have been used to assess impacts on sectors such as food security and tourism, as well as wider economic effects across countries.
They are increasingly incorporating factors such as behaviour and resilience, helping understand the impacts of businesses closing and reopening, how illness affects the workforce, and how fiscal stimulus can assist recovery.
Building better tools for the next crisis
The COVID-19 response showed us that when epidemiological and economic models are developed separately – and often with different assumptions – decision-makers are left weighing conflicting advice.
An integrated epi-econ approach makes those trade-offs explicit and better informs the choices policymakers must make.
They can also reveal hidden non-linear effects – for example, how shutting non-essential activity can ripple through to workers in essential services. They can incorporate feedback loops too, showing how economic support measures during downturns might influence the spread of infections.
Importantly, the inquiry also recommended that future governments ensure greater transparency and communication around decisions, including the science and evidence underpinning them.
The UK Institute for Government argues that combined epi-econ models should be accessible across ministries and departments, ensuring decision-makers are working from a shared evidence base.
Risk and uncertainty are inherent in these models. If New Zealand adopts them, ministers need to be able to understand the models’ inbuilt uncertainties and clearly communicate these to the public.
The Ministry of Health is leading the response to the Royal Commission’s final report and will advise the government on how to act on its recommendations.
In doing so, there is an opportunity to look beyond traditional epidemiological models and consider the added value of integrated approaches.
New Zealand will need stronger collaboration across government, academia and industry so that when the next crisis comes decisions are better informed from the outset.
As he looks to his own coming wrestle with One Nation in the May 9 Farrer byelection, Angus Taylor can only take from Saturday’s South Australian result a sense of deep trepidation.
One Nation drove a front-end loader through the conservative vote in the state election, slicing it in half and gathering up a higher primary vote than the Liberals. It is likely to do something similar in the federal New South Wales regional seat.
On early indications, the frontrunners in Farrer are One Nation candidate David Farley, an agribusinessman and former National Party member, and independent Michelle Milthorpe, a teacher who won every booth in Albury at the 2025 election.
At present Liberal candidate Raissa Butkowski, chosen only a week ago, appears to be running third in the seat, which was held for a quarter of a century by former Liberal leader Sussan Ley and has never been out of conservative hands.
There are many weeks to go and things may change. But a looming issue for the Liberals is: if the battle is likely to end up between One Nation and Milthorpe, who would they least like to see win it? In other words (after preferencing the Nationals) will their preferences be directed to Farley or Milthorpe?
The Liberals are running around branding Milthorpe – who like “teals” receives money from Climate 200 – as a “teal”, a tag she rejects with some spirit. In fact she looks much more like a country independent in the mould of Helen Haines, who holds the Victorian seat of Indi, across the Murray River from Farrer, than a city “teal”.
Regardless, from the Liberals’ point of view, would it not be better for them, if they can’t clinch the seat themselves, to have it in Milthorpe’s hands than in those of One Nation?
A One Nation victory would do more than take that party’s House of Representives presence from one (Barnaby Joyce) to two. It would give it another big shot of momentum – just as its South Australian performance has – not least ahead of the Victorian election in November, where Pauline Hanson promises a strong presence.
Angus Taylor can’t make any progress without regaining for the Liberals many voters who have gone off to One Nation. Equally, the Liberals can’t come close to winning a federal election without getting back many voters lost on the progressive side.
The Liberals’ decision on Farrer preferences will be much driven by which flank of alienated voters they are most worried about – and here they are clearly more concerned about the right flank. They are desperate to get some of the “base” back, rather than the centrist voters.
The Liberals will also know if they preferenced against One Nation, that party’s attacks on them would only become more ferocious.
As well, many of the Liberal Party branch members in Farrer (those who haven’t deserted) will expect the Liberals to preference the Hansonite.
So the Liberals are probably likely in Farrer to feed the One Nation beast, even if that potentially carries a longer run cost.
South Australia has shown that One Nation doesn’t need to actually secure many seats to be a major player. In SA it will, at most, win a handful of lower house seats. Its power comes from being a party of grievance and disruption.
Nationals leader Matt Canavan has been taking on Hanson very directly but, on the national polls, Taylor shows little sign of being able to effectively counter her and her party. One Nation out-shouts him in articulating grievances, and undermines the Liberal vote with its disruption.
As election analyst Antony Green puts it, One Nation is on a “search and destroy mission” against the conservative parties. Taylor is in desperate need of a strategy to counter the Hansonites; the South Australian result just underscores that need.
You can’t make this stuff up. The President of the United States, while sitting next to the Japanese Prime Minister in the Oval Office, just celebrated the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour.
When asked by a Japanese reporter on Friday why the US didn’t consult with allies before launching the surprise attack on Iran, Trump said: “One thing you don’t want is to signal too much. We went in very hard — and we didn’t tell anybody about it because we wanted surprise.”
Then, turning to Sanae Takaichi, he said: “Who knows better about surprise than Japan?” Moments before, sitting on the plush lemon chair in the gold-encrusted Oval Office, Takaichi had been smiling from ear to ear. Trump wiped the smile off her face with one question:
“Why didn’t you tell me about Pearl Harbor?” By now the Prime Minister was squirming uncomfortably. Trump looked straight at her and said: “Okay, RIGHT? He [the journalist] is asking me, do you believe in surprise?
“I think you much more so than us. And we had a surprise, and because of that surprise, we probably knocked out 50 percent — and much more than we anticipated doing. So if I go and tell everybody about it, it is no longer a surprise.”
For more than 80 years the US has claimed a moral high ground on the basis of its rejection of “sneak attacks”. In one rhetorical flourish Trump exposed the jarring desolation of what the US now stands for.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Day of Infamy” speech was delivered on December 8, 1941, following Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbour the day before.
Responding to ‘unprovoked’ sneak attack Roosevelt, like President Pezeshkian of Iran today, was responding to an “unprovoked” sneak attack. President Roosevelt pointed out that negotiations were ongoing and, for him, the aggressor’s conduct was false, deceptive and below contempt:
“Yesterday, December 7th, 1941 — a date which will live in infamy — the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.”
As with President Pezeshkian of Iran today, Franklin Delano Roosevelt drew the obvious conclusion: the nation was facing an existential threat.
“The people of the United States have already formed their opinions and well understand the implications to the very life and safety of our nation.”
Last week, I interviewed US Ambassador (ret) Chas Freeman who emphasised that the Iranians fully understood that the US-Israeli war machine launched against them would not stop unless compelled to do so.
For the Iranians, the goal is nothing less than to drive the Americans out of the region. To understand the intensity of their determination simply hear the words of FDR from 1941:
“No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory. I believe that I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost, but will make it very certain that this form of treachery shall never again endanger us.”
I would remind US President Donald Trump that in referencing that other sneak attack he might have paused to ask: “Who won that war in the end?”
Eugene Doyle is a writer based in Wellington, New Zealand, and a contributor to Asia Pacific Report. He has written extensively on the Middle East, as well as peace and security issues in the Asia Pacific region. This article was first published on his website www.solidarity.co.nz
In recent days, Israel and the United States have expressed outrage over the deliberate and indiscriminate targeting of civilians and civilian residences and infrastructure in Israel and the Gulf by Iranian forces.
They have cited the illegality of such attacks, urged global condemnation, and demanded that human rights organisations speak out.
Having spent years weakening the laws meant to protect civilians, they are now discovering that those same laws are too fragile to protect their own people.
Israeli and US officials seem unaware that the crimes they now condemn are ones they themselves have long justified as legitimate military actions.
Take cluster munitions. Following Iran’s reported use of these indiscriminate weapons on March 9 around Tel Aviv, Israeli officials condemned their use in populated areas.
“The Iranian regime is firing cluster bombs at Israeli civilians. Their deliberate and repeated use against civilians shows that the Iranian terror regime is seeking to maximise civilian deaths and harm,” declared Israel’s Foreign Ministry, which provided an infographic explaining how the weapon — banned by 124 countries — is inherently indiscriminate.
The Pentagon echoed the criticism, with Admiral Brad Cooper, the chief of US Central Command, condemning Iran’s use of “inherently indiscriminate” cluster munitions.
4 million cluster munitions Yet in 2006 Israel fired more than four million cluster munitions into southern Lebanon, turning large swaths of the country into a no-go zone while insisting their use was a military necessity.
Unexploded cluster munitions continue to terrorise Lebanese civilians, maiming and killing at least 400 people as they detonated years after the war. Israel reportedly resumed using cluster munitions in Lebanon in 2025 but would neither confirm nor deny doing so.
Israel’s vast use of these weapons in 2006 helped spur the 2010 Convention on Cluster Munitions, banning them as inherently indiscriminate. Yet Israel and the United States — along with Russia and Iran — have refused to ratify the treaty, insisting they may be used legitimately in wartime.
In 2023 and 2024, the Biden administrationshipped large quantities of cluster munitions to Ukraine despite warnings that unexploded ordnance would endanger civilians for decades to come. The consequences are now clear — having challenged the ban on these weapons, Israel now finds its own civilians under attack from them.
Iranian attacks on Israeli and Gulf civilian infrastructure — from residences to schools to water desalination plants — have drawn similar condemnations as unlawful attacks on civilians, even though such strikes have been preceded or followed by unlawful attacks on Iranian civilians and infrastructure.
On March 8, the United Nations Security Council issued a resolution singling out Iranian attacks on civilians for condemnation, even though Israeli and US forces had also struck a girls’ school, civilian residences, and an Iranian water desalination plant, among other civilian sites.
Even AIPACchimed in, bemoaning that Iran was “killing civilians” in Bahrain following a strike that killed a young woman on March 9.
Condemnations ring hollow These condemnations ring hollow in the wake of Israel’s vast destruction of residential buildings, schools, universities, and agricultural lands in Gaza, leaving the territory buried under 61 billion tons of rubble and largely uninhabitable, and more than 75,000 people, the majority women and children, dead.
For more than three years since its latest war in Gaza, Israel has defended its assault on Palestinian civilians as military necessity, blamed Hamas for “starting” the war, and rejected condemnations as products of bias and antisemitism.
Israeli and US officials have gone further still, at times rejecting very applicability of international law. “I don’t need international law,” asserted President Donald Trump earlier this year; adding “my own morality” is “the only thing that can stop me”.
“Secretary of War” Pete Hegseth has suggested dispensing with international humanitarian law altogether, declaring that the United States should employ “maximum lethality, not tepid legality” and give “no quarter, no mercy to our enemies” — rhetoric that, when applied in an armed conflict, constitutes a war crime.
Such contempt for international law may seem convenient for states that believe their power shields them from consequences.
Weakened rules an invitation But in a world where destructive force is widely distributed, weakening the rules meant to protect civilians invites others to do the same. The result is not greater security but a downward spiral in which every side claims necessity while civilians pay the price.
International humanitarian law was never meant to protect only one side’s people. It protects civilians precisely because it binds all parties equally.
When powerful states defy those rules, they do more than harm their adversaries; they weaken the only framework that can protect their own civilians in return. If governments truly want to safeguard their people, the answer is not selective outrage but consistent compliance — uphold the law, apply it universally, and defend it even when it constrains your own actions. Sarah Leah Whitson is the executive director of Democracy for the Arab World Now and formerly executive director of Human Rights Watch’s Middle East and North Africa Division. Republished from Common Dreams under a Creative Commons licence.
ER Report: Here is a summary of significant articles published on EveningReport.nz on March 22, 2026.
One Nation’s surge and Liberal Party’s collapse in SA election reveal tectonic shifts in Australian politics Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Rob Manwaring, Associate Professor, Politics and Public Policy, Flinders University The tectonic plates of South Australian politics have fundamentally shifted. Peter Malinauskas’s Labor government has won a second term with a landslide win. The final count should see Labor win around 33 seats in the 47 seat
The Women’s Asian Cup was a major success for Australian soccer, despite the Matildas’ heartbreaker Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Fiona Crawford, Adjunct Lecturer at the Centre for Justice, Queensland University of Technology There was a lot of talk about winning trophies in the lead-up to the 2026 Women’s Asian Cup final, in which the Matildas were narrowly defeated by Japan 1–0 in Saturday night’s final. It
End of the petrodollar? How Iran war is reshaping the global economy Democracy Now! AMY GOODMAN: This is Democracy Now! I’m Amy Goodman, with Nermeen Shaikh. NERMEEN SHAIKH: Global oil and natural gas prices are soaring after Israel bombed a massive natural gas reserve in Iran, the largest in the world. Iran retaliated by twice attacking the world’s largest liquid natural gas production facility, located in Qatar.
Labor easily wins South Australian election with One Nation beating Liberals into second on primary votes Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Adrian Beaumont, Election Analyst (Psephologist) at The Conversation; and Honorary Associate, School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of Melbourne For today’s South Australian state election, The Poll Bludger’s results have Labor winning 31 of the 47 lower house seats, the Liberals four, One Nation one and
Wenda condemns ‘cruel’ arbitrary arrests of West Papuans in Tambrauw Asia Pacific Report An exiled leader of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) has condemned Indonesia’s “cruel and humiliating” arbitrary arrest of 12 West Papuan local farmers in Tambrauw Regency this week and has demanded their release. According to Human Rights Monitor, the arrests took place on March 18, after Indonesia conducted military
The tectonic plates of South Australian politics have fundamentally shifted. Peter Malinauskas’s Labor government has won a second term with a landslide win. The final count should see Labor win around 33 seats in the 47 seat House of Assembly. This result dwarfs the Labor “Rann-slide” of 2006.
The SA Liberals suffered a humiliating and record loss, reduced to single digits, with perhaps as few as six seats in the lower house. The party will need to undergo a significant rebuild if it is to become competitive again.
The key story of the night was the insurgency of One Nation. The right-wing populist party has secured a higher primary vote than the Liberals, with a statewide total of 22% against the Liberals’ 19%.
In regional areas and One Nation’s target seats, the party came first in the primary vote count, and in the seat of Narungga secured 37% of the primary vote. With unpredictable preference flows, the party could secure two lower house seats.
Key battlegrounds
Labor’s landslide came off the back of the Liberal collapse. Labor easily won a suite of metropolitan and suburban seats such as Colton, Morialta, and Hartley, the latter of which saw former Liberal leader Vincent Tarzia lose his seat. Former Liberal strongholds, such as the seat of Unley, fell to a disciplined Labor Party headed by the charismatic Peter Malinauskas.
In the regions, the Liberal vote collapse was exacerbated by the dominant rise of One Nation. In a striking irony, it could be Labor preferences that secure some Liberal holds. The Liberals’ decision to preference One Nation over Labor may also come back to haunt them.
One Nation has a realistic chance in two or three seats, such as Hammond. As Pauline Hanson put it at One Nation’s after party, she has left a series of “landmines” for the premier.
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More pressingly, One Nation sees this as a springboard for the Victorian state election and the federal Farrer byelection.
Fractures on the right
The conservative and right side of politics has fractured completely. There might be a temptation to see this as a one-off sugar hit for One Nation. Yet, this result has been coming for quite some time. The implosion of the SA Liberals is not a sudden phenomenon.
On polling data, the One Nation surge began at the start of 2026, in the wake of the December 2025 Bondi terrorist attack. Historically, the party has had limited presence in South Australia, often returning a primary vote of about 4%.
The SA Liberals have been in structural decline for some time, and this has been accelerated by recent events. The Liberal leadership churn has undermined the party’s standing, with four leaders in four years. The party has faced a number of scandals across a range of seats including Mount Gambier, Narrungga, MacKillop and Black.
More telling, and an under-appreciated issue, is that the party is no longer able to retain MPs. Former MPs such as Dan Cregan (Kavel) and Jing Lee (MLC) – both of whom left to become independents – are symptomatic of a party where its members feel increasingly unwelcome.
Liberalism running out of steam
One Nation has taken advantage of the ideological and factional instability of the Liberal Party. The conservative efforts to control the party has undermined unity and discipline. Shortly after Tarzia became leader, Conservative Ben Hood led the charge to ban late-term abortions. It led to an appalling debacle with moderate Liberal MP Michelle Lemsink forced to jump into a taxi to fend off the vote, while on medical leave recovering from cancer treatment.
This incident was a form of payback from conservative Liberals who felt disenfranchised during the Marshall Liberal government (2018-2022), which saw a number of moderate legislative successes.
A key flashpoint on election night was the exchange between moderate Liberal federal Senator Anne Rushton and state Liberal MP Nick McBride. Wearing an ankle bracelet as he faces trial for domestic violence charges (an allegation he strongly denies), McBride argued the Liberals have far more in common with One Nation than they do with Labor. Rushton, in contrast, argued the party should actively pursue its “liberal values”.
Here is the ideological and strategic dilemma that state leader Ashton Hurn and federal leader Angus Taylor face. Conservatives will push the leaders to adopt One-Nation-lite policies to win back regional and former safe seats. Yet, moderates will argue that since the party is no longer in any meaningful sense a party of the city, it needs to radically overhaul its offerings to win back inner-city and more affluent suburban seats.
It’s far from clear what a re-energised Liberal Party could look like. Party leaders may well invoke the ghost of Robert Menzies or the formula of John Howard, but neither of these premierships offer much to a shrunken Liberal Party in a far more fluid and fragmented Australian polity.
It’s highly likely the One Nation insurgency is here to stay.
There was a lot of talk about winning trophies in the lead-up to the 2026 Women’s Asian Cup final, in which the Matildas were narrowly defeated by Japan 1–0 in Saturday night’s final.
It was the third time Australia had met Japan in the final and represented the last chance for this golden generation to win a major tournament on home soil.
The result, which mirrored the 2014 and 2018 Women’s Asian Cup finals, was another case of so near yet so far for the Matildas.
The team has won hearts and minds but not since 2010 trophies.
So what did we learn? And where do we go from here?
For the final at Sydney’s Stadium Australia, 74,397 people turned up – the largest crowd in Women’s Asian Cup history.
In making the top four, the Matildas qualified for the 2027 Women’s World Cup to be held in Brazil.
Winning trophies is difficult – hosting was strategic
Australians have high expectations for their sporting teams.
But winning trophies is difficult, as evidenced by the fact major trophies have to date eluded the Matildas’ golden generation.
Understood best in retrospect, the Matildas’ 2010 Women’s Asian Cup win was momentous. It was just the team’s second time competing in the Asian confederation tournament and marked the first time an Australian team – women’s or men’s – had won the trophy.
That early Women’s Asian Cup success – finishing runners-up in 2006 and champions in 2010 – inadvertently sent a message that being crowned Asian champions was a straightforward thing.
But anything less than a trophy does not necessarily equate to a loss.
The Women’s Asian Cup is just one step in the Matildas’ and Australian women’s soccer’s plan, which will benefit not just the national team but girls and women playing at the grassroots.
The strategy
Just one player, Sam Kerr, remains from that 2010 team (Tameka Yallop missed the 2026 tournament with a hamstring injury).
The Matildas have been relying on the golden generation to carry the nation’s hope for more than a decade. Ensuring there will be more Sam Kerrs is crucial.
Which is why Australia’s bid to host the 2026 tournament was strategic.
Continuing to inspire the next generation of girls and women by normalising participating in, attending and viewing major women’s soccer events in integral.
But a post-tournament influx of players and fans is only good if the infrastructure, systems and pathways are in place to accommodate and retain them.
So, in addition to providing a chance for Australia to both compete for a trophy and gain invaluable experience leading into the 2027 Women’s World Cup, bidding to host the Asian Cup represented an opportunity to do three crucial things.
Third, remind us that women’s soccer is playing the long game. Trophies will remain highly sought-after but the rarity of winning them will arguably magnify their value. They’re one piece of the puzzle.
As former Matilda turned administrator Sarah Walsh indicated, the narrow metrics on which women’s soccer are judged are rarely applied to men’s sport.
To focus on bums on seats ignores the systemic and gender inequality women’s soccer faces.
It was no accident Japan was again in the Women’s Asian Cup final. It’s a team that has focused on long-term development and regeneration, including a 50-year plan that concentrates on steadily increasing grassroots participation rates, improving national team rankings and hosting and winning a World Cup by 2050.
Japan’s approach recognises trophies are a byproduct of strategic investment and development.
So while winning silverware would have been great, the Matildas’ second-place finish is still really good.
That is, the Matildas and their impact – encapsulated with the “‘til it’s done” edict that signals the long-term approach it will require – can be considered a work in progress.
AMY GOODMAN: This is Democracy Now! I’m Amy Goodman, with Nermeen Shaikh.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: Global oil and natural gas prices are soaring after Israel bombed a massive natural gas reserve in Iran, the largest in the world. Iran retaliated by twice attacking the world’s largest liquid natural gas production facility, located in Qatar.
Iran also attacked key energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. At one point, the price of oil reached US$118 a barrel, a 60 percent jump since the US and Israel launched their war on Iran.
In a post online, Trump threatened to blow up the entire South Pars gas field if Iran continued to target the Qatari facility. Trump also claimed the US, “knew nothing” about the Israeli attack on the South Pars gas field, but The Wall Street Journal reports Trump approved the strike to pressure Iran to open up the critical Strait of Hormuz.
AMY GOODMAN: About 20 percent of the world’s oil exports flows through the Strait of Hormuz. President Trump has asked other countries to send warships to help force open the strait, but many nations are rejecting the request.
We’re joined now by Laleh Khalili, professor of Gulf studies at University of Exeter and the author of several books, including her latest, Extractive Capitalism: How Commodities and Cronyism Drive the Global Economy. She also wrote Sinews of War and Trade: Shipping and Capitalism in the Arabian Peninsula.
Professor Khalili, thanks so much for being with us. Can you start off by talking about the state of the Strait of Hormuz right now, its closure; President Trump, according to Reuters, perhaps sending in thousands of troops, what exactly this means; and the Israeli bombing of the South Pars gas field, the largest in the world?
President Trump said, in a rare rebuke, the US didn’t know. Most people are saying that is highly unlikely, that is probably untrue.
[embedded content] The end of the petrodollar? Video: Democracy Now!
Transcript:
LALEH KHALILI: So, the Strait of Hormuz is one of the most important choke points for oil — a choke point being an area during which, if it’s closed down, you end up getting a major disruption in the flow of global trade.
So, the Strait of Hormuz is one. The Suez Canal is another one. The Panama Canal is another one.
And there are a number of these different choke points all around the world. Now, what’s specific about Hormuz and what’s distinctive about it is that it is the choke point where the quantity of oil that goes through is higher than any other commodity that actually flows across the strait.
As you just mentioned, about 30 percent of the global oil flows through that. And part of the reason for that is, of course, that the world’s biggest oil producers — some of the biggest oil producers are all sitting around the Persian/Arabian Gulf, so Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Abu Dhabi, which all are huge producers of oil in the first place, and then natural gas in the case of Qatar and Iran in second place.
Now, what has been fascinating is that anybody who has one of these apps that you can put on your phone, like MarineTraffic or VesselFinder, you can actually take a look at the flow of traffic, the flow of vessel traffic, flow of ship traffic, through these different seas in the world.
And if you zoom in on the Strait of Hormuz, what you’ll find is that instead of seeing actually a steady traffic of little usually pink or green arrows going through, which indicate tankers, what you end up seeing are major clusters of ships that are bunched up very near ports where oil is produced and usually put on ships.
What that indicates is that, basically, for a number of different reasons — and I’m going to go into that in a minute — the flow of ships, the flow of ship traffic, has basically come to a halt.
Now, the reasons behind this are multifold. Of course, there is, number one, that Iran is attacking a number of the ships that are going through, and the way that it’s attacking them is through the use of very cheap either drones or sea mines, and that means that it’s basically almost impossible to deal with this particular threat, because the drones are produced so extensively in terms of number and they’re so inexpensive that they can basically be replenished even if they are destroyed.
Also being smaller, they’re much harder to target, etc. So, there has been a number of drone attacks against ships carrying oil through the channel, and so, of course, that scares a lot of carriers, a lot of tankers.
The second reason, which I actually think is perhaps even more significant, in part because it is actually not something that either the US or Iran can control, is that the moment something like this happens, the moment that there is a threat against ships, what you end up having is that insurance brokers, primarily situated in London, but there are, of course, some also in the US, China and in Europe, but really the centre for provision of maritime insurance is London, at Lloyd’s, and the ship brokers end up putting a specific war risk premium on ships.
And that means that going from something like 1 percent of the cost of the hull, meaning the ship’s body, or the cargo, meaning what it’s carrying, goes to something like 5 percent, or it goes from one fraction of 1 percent to, say, 5 percent. So that means that suddenly, instead of paying in the hundreds of thousands for insurance for a super tanker, what you’re looking at is millions in insurance, which, of course, increases the cost of the oil that is traveling. So, that’s the second reason.
The third reason is something that the Houthis noticed when they were blockading the Red Sea in support of the Palestinians when Israel was committing genocide against Palestinians. And that is that sometimes the threat alone suffices in getting the ships to stop going through or, indeed, to make declarations that allows for them a degree of protection.
So, the Houthis, when they had blockaded the sea, had asked that any ships that claimed that they were not touching Israel, meaning they were not delivering to or picking up from Israel, could be allowed to go through the canal.
And so, it happened that this automatic identification system that a lot of ships — well, all ships carry — it’s called the AIS system, and the AIS system indicates what ship is in the vicinity of the system, what it’s carrying and what flag it has, meaning which authorities it responds to.
So, now what we’re seeing is that apparently Iran has mentioned that any ship, for example, that is going to China will be let through, or any ship that is not coming from one of these allied states to the US will be allowed through. Of course, there is a lot of variation in what kind of thing they have requested or what is being reported, so it’s a lot harder to see what exactly the AIS systems are being on these ships.
As I said, we are mostly seeing them clustering and waiting in these locations, one of the main ones being the Port of Fujairah, which is actually not in the Persian Gulf. It is in the Gulf of Oman.
And oil from Abu Dhabi, which is on the Persian Gulf side, is shipped to Fujaira through a pipeline. So we’re seeing a cluster of ships near Fujaira.
Iran, of course, also attacked Fujaira port. And then we’re seeing a cluster of ships near Ras Laffan, which is the main gas production and gas lifting port in Qatar. The third is, of course, around the oil fields of Saudi Arabia, a little bit further up the Persian Gulf. And so, these clusters of ships are waiting there and hoping to be able to at some point pick up oil to be carried out.
But we’re not seeing much of that flow anywhere at all.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: Professor Khalili, you mentioned that there are — they are looking for, the Iranians, to see which vessels in the Strait of Hormuz — to what countries they’re affiliated, looking at their flags. Chinese vessels have reportedly been permitted to pass through the strait. China imports about 40 percent of its oil from the Middle East and has been one of the largest buyers of Iranian oil. There are also reports that the Iranians are suggesting they’d consider allowing a small number of oil tankers to pass through the strait if the oil cargo is traded in Chinese yuan rather than —
LALEH KHALILI: Yes.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: — US dollars. If you could comment on that?
LALEH KHALILI: This is really fascinating, because, of course, we know that the fundamental basis of the US imperial order since the end of the Second World War has been, on the one hand, petroleum and, on the other hand, the US dollar. The globe’s production and finance worlds are dependent on the petroleum that the US has guaranteed the flow of since the end of the Second World War, and which, until the nationalisation of oil in the 1970s and 1980s, basically controlled something like 60 percent of the world’s oil reserves.
After nationalisation, that percentage dropped dramatically, but the US dollar continues to be, and the financial channels that the US has crafted, continue to be a very significant bolster for the empire.
So, the fact that Iran is actually looking for alternatives to the dollar in order to challenge the petrodollar regime, which is, you know, as I said, one of the fundamentals of the US empire, is a really interesting and quite clever indication of how the Iranians are hoping to influence the crafting of a world post this war, or a new world order post this war, where there’s a multipolar financial system, where, for example, the dollar is no longer a single currency that rules the world and the US is the only channel that controls — or, the only power that controls financial channels, because, of course, the US has used this inordinate power to strong-arm various states, to institute sanctions, to make it difficult for its enemies, for example, to purchase oil.
And, of course, it has used it to coerce a lot of countries, as we see, for example, in the case of Cuba or Iran, or indeed Russia, to do its bidding. So, the fact that Iran is calling for petroyuans to become an alternative to petrodollars is actually quite significant also in indicating that the Iranians are well aware of how extensively the US has used its coercive sanction capabilities, through its control of the financial channels and through its mastery of the petrodollar, and are trying to erode that power.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: Professor Khalili, you know, the US is now the world’s largest oil producer, but because oil is a globally priced commodity, the price goes up in the US if the world market price goes up. But —
LALEH KHALILI: That’s right.
NERMEEN SHAIKH:— how important do you think this might be in Trump’s calculation? Because another consideration, another aspect of this, may be that as oil supplies diminish from the Middle East, the US could benefit, because it is the world’s largest oil producer, and the price of its oil will go up, and the demand for its oil.
LALEH KHALILI: Absolutely. What a fantastic question, because, in fact, we have seen that when the Russian invasion of Ukraine began and the Nord Stream gas, natural gas, pipelines to Europe were sabotaged, we now — there are now indications that this may have been done at the behest of the US.and its Ukrainian allies. But nevertheless, when that sabotage happened, it actually translated into massive gains for US natural gas production.
The thing is that there are a number of reasons why oil is not — why the US cannot become the sole oil producer for the whole of the world. One is the question of proximity, for example. The second is the question of capacity that the US has in order to actually replace, for example, the oil that is produced by Saudi Arabia or by Iran or, indeed, by Russia.
But the third factor — and I think that this is the one that I think we should look out for — is that in the last 10 or 15 years, China has actually begun generating an alternative set of fuels, sustainable fuels, and developing technologies, particularly of electric and battery technologies, that will allow for, for example, solar or wind energy to displace fossil fuels.
And the more that the price of oil goes up, which, of course, we’ve seen that happen, as you mentioned earlier — and, in fact, this also translates into major windfalls for US oil companies. This oil prices going up benefits Chevron. It benefits Exxon. It doesn’t benefit the average US citizen at the petrol stations, at the gas stations, but it does benefit the oil companies.
So, it definitely does — that does happen. But the higher the price of oil goes up, the relatively cheaper it becomes to actually have sustainable alternatives, which, of course, that means that it benefits China in a major way, since China is way ahead of the rest of the world in producing these technologies and in producing them cheaply.
The solar panels that are being produced in China are a fraction of the price of solar panels that were being produced something like 15 or 20 years ago. And I think this shift is actually a major long-term concern for the oil companies.
In the short term, they’re taking all the windfall that they can get. But this, again, is — the kind of a postwar order that will likely also have major implications for the kind of energy people are paying to use or people are willing to use, actually.
AMY GOODMAN: We just have 20 seconds. But the effect of the bombing of the South Pars facility, the largest gas facility in the world, what it means for Iran, what it means for the world, and President Trump denying the US had anything to do with, which most do not believe?
LALEH KHALILI: No, absolutely not. There is no way that Israel would have actually done this without coordination with the United States. And, in fact, the channels that deny, for example, that the US coordinated, or report Trump’s denials, are the channels that are often used to feed us the kinds of lies that the administration tells us.
But what is quite significant about South Pars — and I know it’s a very short time left, so I’m going to be very quick about it — is that the South Pars field is actually shared between Iran and Qatar.
The North Dome, which is on the south part of the Persian Gulf, is Qatar’s share of this major field, and Iran’s bit is in the northern part of the Persian Gulf.
And so, the destruction of the infrastructure there will not only have an effect on Iranians’ ability to produce electricity and fuel their various kinds of industries and/or homes, but it will also have an effect on the infrastructures that are used by the Qataris and which the Iranians and Qataris have been using in an extraordinary degree — to an extraordinary degree of coordination since the fields have been used. So, this actually also affects Qatar.
The bombing itself also affects Qatar. And I don’t think that this is a calculation that the rather know-nothing Trump administration has taken into account.
AMY GOODMAN: Laleh Khalili, we want to thank you so much for being with us, professor of Gulf studies at University of Exeter, author of several books, including her latest, Extractive Capitalism: How Commodities and Cronyism Drive the Global Economy. Thanks so much for being there.
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Adrian Beaumont, Election Analyst (Psephologist) at The Conversation; and Honorary Associate, School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of Melbourne
For today’s South Australian state election, The Poll Bludger’s results have Labor winning 31 of the 47 lower house seats, the Liberals four, One Nation one and independents one, with ten still in some doubt. This is already a majority for Labor.
When doubtful seats are assigned to the most likely winner, Labor has 35 seats, One Nation four, the Liberals four and independents four. If this occurs, Labor would gain eight seats from the 2022 election, which was already a thumping win for Labor, the Liberals would be down 12, One Nation up four and independents steady.
Primary votes are currently 37.8% Labor (down 1.9% in booth matched swing from the 2022 election), 20.8% One Nation (up 18.5%), 18.4% Liberals (down 16.9%), 12.0% Greens (up 1.9%) and 5.6% independents (up 2.9%). A Labor vs Liberal two-party estimate has Labor winning by 59.2–40.8, a 4.6% swing to Labor.
While SA Labor was a first-term government, a negative impact from a somewhat unpopular federal Labor government should have been expected. Labor’s landslide will be devastating for the Liberals.
While One Nation is beating the Liberals on primary votes by 3.4%, which of these parties wins the most seats is still to be determined.
The Poll Bludger’s results map currently shows only one Adelaide seat being won by a conservative party (Bragg by the Liberals). If Australia’s cities keep trending to the left, it will be very difficult for the right to win here.
Except for a late experimental Resolve poll that was conducted using AI, the polling for this election appears to have been accurate. It will be at least another week before we have final primary votes for the election.
There are many seats where the electoral commission selected the incorrect two candidates for its election night two candidate preferred. In these seats, the count will need to be realigned between the correct two candidates. This will probably occur early next week. One Nation’s surge meant that the old Labor vs Liberal two candidate selection no longer automatically applies.
The large number of pre-poll votes are unlikely to be counted until later tonight, with some not finished by the end of tonight. These votes may affect some results, but the overall Labor landslide will still occur.
I will update this article Sunday morning with more details on the results, including a look at the upper house. In the upper house, 11 of the 22 members were up by statewide proportional representation with preferences. A quota for election was one-twelfth of the vote or 8.3%.
Late SA Resolve poll
I covered four SA polls in Friday’s article. In a further poll, Resolve conducted “a new experimental AI poll” of SA for Nine newspapers on March 16 from a sample of 1,112. This poll gave Labor 32% of the primary vote, One Nation 28%, the Liberals 18%, the Greens 10% and all Others 11%.
An exiled leader of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) has condemned Indonesia’s “cruel and humiliating” arbitrary arrest of 12 West Papuan local farmers in Tambrauw Regency this week and has demanded their release.
According to Human Rights Monitor, the arrests took place on March 18, after Indonesia conducted military operations in the Fef and Bamus Bama districts.
People were dragged out of their homes, tortured, and detained without any warrants or explanation.
“This is how Indonesia treats West Papuans, as less than human,” said ULMWP interim president Benny Wenda in a statement.
“The 12 men arrested in Tambrauw have been labelled TPNPB [West Papua National Liberation Army] and stigmatised as terrorists and criminals by the Indonesian colonisers.
“But who is the real terrorist? These men are the customary landowners, simply defending their forest, their homes, from the military who come to destroy everything.”
Wenda said the Indigenous people had been living there for thousands of years — “long before Indonesia invaded and stole our sovereignty.”
He added: “They didn’t go to Jakarta; Indonesia came to them with bombs and guns.”
Indonesia ‘stolen our resources’ Wenda asked who was the real criminal.
“The people of Tambrauw have been tending their gardens in peace for generations. It is Indonesia who has come and stolen our resources, torn down our forest to plant rice and sugar so people in Jakarta can eat.
“There is no real development in West Papua, only business for Indonesia.”
Wenda said that when he looked at the pictures of the arrested Papuans with their hands tied, forced face down on a police station floor, he saw his own people.
“They represent all West Papuans — humiliated and degraded in their own land.”
Wenda said Indonesia could never defeat the Papuan spirit.
“You can arrest us, torture us, kill us, but the spirit of freedom lives on in every West Papuan,” he said.
Experienced trauma “Whether they are in the bush, the city, in exile, or even working in the Indonesian government, every West Papuan has experienced trauma at the hands of the Indonesian military and police.
“Every single one of us has an uncle who has been killed, a mother who has been raped, or a brother who has been tortured in police custody.
“We all long for merdeka [freedom]. That is why Indonesia has deployed over 80,000 security forces to terrorise our land — because they are terrified of our desire for freedom.”
As well as demanding that the 12 Papuans be released, Wenda said Indonesia must also finally allow foreign journalists to report on West Papua and immediately facilitate a visit to West Papua by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
ER Report: Here is a summary of significant articles published on EveningReport.nz on March 21, 2026.
Israel – the parasite state sabotaging peace in the Middle East COMMENTARY: By Marcus Alexander In a stunning resignation that has sent shockwaves through Washington, former National Counterterrorism Center Director Joe Kent has exposed what many have long suspected but few have dared to state publicly — Israel is systematically undermining peace in the Middle East to serve its own expansionist agenda. Joe Kent, a 20-year
Northern Mariana Islands’ security and stability vital for US, say military leaders By Mark Rabago, RNZ Pacific Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas correspondent The Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands’ (CNMI) economic struggles are not just a local issue, but a matter of strategic importance to American operations in the Indo-Pacific, say senior US military leaders. In a letter, dated 25 February 2026, Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of
Caitlin Johnstone: Iran is forcing the world to care about US-Israeli warmongering Report by Dr David Robie – Café Pacific. – COMMENTARY: By Caitlin Johnstone Westerners are about to start paying a lot more attention to the war in Iran as massive US-Israeli escalations point to a coming energy crisis set to impact on the whole world. Israel has bombed the world’s largest natural gas field in
Why Middle East gas field attacks could send energy prices soaring Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Tina Soliman Hunter, Professor of Energy and Natural Resources Law, Macquarie University Israel’s bombing of Iran’s South Pars gas field has sent shockwaves through global energy markets. The South Pars gas field is part of the world’s largest gas field, known as North Dome, shared by Iran
If you still need to fly amid global travel chaos, here’s what to know Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Steven Leib, Associate Professor in Aviation, CQUniversity Australia We are now three weeks into the war between the United States, Israel and Iran, which has grown to engulf much of the Middle East. There are few signs the conflict will slow down or stop anytime soon. The
Early wins for the social media ban, new survey claims. But the full picture is far more complicated Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Susan M. Sawyer, Professor of Adolescent Health The University of Melbourne; Director, Royal Children’s Hospital Centre for Adolescent Health; and Murdoch Children’s Research Institute, The University of Melbourne Australia’s world-first national legislation to restrict access to social media accounts for children under 16 years old has been
Ian Powell: Iran, US imperialism and the New Zealand lapdog COMMENTARY: By Ian Powell When Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, was assassinated in the opening stages of the US-Israeli war against Iran, I didn’t mourn. Khamenei was not someone who deserved to be mourned notwithstanding my contempt for the increasing use of assassination by aggressor nations; in this case the United States and
Keith Rankin Analysis – 1956, 1967, 1973, 1979 and all that: Shipping, Oil, and Inflation Analysis by Keith Rankin, 20 March 2026. The human world changed twice during the twentieth century. The first transition lasted from 1914 to 1945. The principal cause of World War Two was World War One. So, to understand the drivers of that long transition, indeed a great levelling event, it is necessary to investigate the
In a stunning resignation that has sent shockwaves through Washington, former National Counterterrorism Center Director Joe Kent has exposed what many have long suspected but few have dared to state publicly — Israel is systematically undermining peace in the Middle East to serve its own expansionist agenda.
Joe Kent, a 20-year Army Special Forces veteran and Gold Star husband who lost his first wife in a Syria suicide bombing, didn’t mince words. His accusation is simple yet devastating: Israel is intentionally sabotaging diplomatic solutions because peace threatens its strategic objectives.
The most compelling evidence supporting Kent’s claim is the targeted assassination of Ali Larijani, Iran’s National Security Adviser and chief nuclear negotiator.
According to Kent, Larijani wasn’t just another Iranian official — he was actively engaged in negotiations that could have de-escalated regional tensions.
“Larijani was eager to get us a deal,” Kent revealed in an interview with Tucker Carlson.
But instead of pursuing diplomacy, US-Israeli strikes eliminated him, along with his son and several staff members. The message could not be clearer — anyone willing to negotiate for peace becomes a target.
This wasn’t just another military operation. Larijani represented the pragmatic wing of the Iranian establishment — someone capable of conducting the sorts of talks needed to end conflicts.
By eliminating him, Israel ensured that the path to negotiation was closed, leaving only the path of escalation.
Iran’s National Security Adviser and chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani . . . assassinated by Israel, he represented the pragmatic wing of the Iranian establishment. Image: Wikipedia
Energy warfare masquerading as security Kent’s second explosive claim involves energy infrastructure. He argues that strategic opportunities — particularly Qatar’s gas potential to stabilise global markets — have been deliberately targeted to increase tensions rather than reduce them .
The facts support him. On March 18, 2026, Israel launched a significant aerial assault on Iran’s South Pars gas field, which provides nearly 70 percent of Iran’s domestic gas. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu admitted Israel “acted alone” in this attack.
The result? Iran retaliated by striking Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City — the world’s premier LNG hub — damaging approximately 17 percent of Qatar’s export capacity .
Global gas prices surged toward US$117 per barrel. The UK benchmark peaked at almost 183p per therm. Markets destabilised. And for what?
Here is the inconvenient truth, a stable energy market benefiting from Qatari and Iranian gas would reduce conflict incentives. By attacking this infrastructure, Israel ensured that economic interdependence — often the foundation of lasting peace — remains impossible.
Even President Trump distanced himself from the attack, stating the US “knew nothing about this particular strike” and describing it as Israel “violently lashing out”. When an American president feels compelled to publicly disavow his closest regional ally’s actions, something is fundamentally broken.
The ‘clean break’ strategy: 30 years of sabotage Kent’s accusations didn’t emerge from nowhere. They reflect a consistent pattern dating back to 1996, when a group of neoconservatives — including figures who would later serve in the Bush administration — produced a policy paper titled “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm”.
This document, prepared for Netanyahu, explicitly rejected the “land for peace” formula and proposed reordering the Middle East through military confrontations and regime change. It identified Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya and Iran as targets.
It called for “removing Saddam Hussein from power” and “weakening, containing, and even rolling back Syria”.
Three decades later, we’re living the consequences. The Iraq war cost thousands of American lives. Syria descended into a catastrophic civil war. And now Iran faces sustained attacks. All while Israel’s security — not America’s — remained the central objective.
Kent’s resignation letter directly connected these dots: “It is clear that we started this war due to pressure from Israel and its powerful American lobby . . . This is the same tactic the Israelis used to draw us into the disastrous Iraq war”.
The human cost Perhaps the most damning aspect of Kent’s accusation is personal. His wife, Navy cryptologist Shannon Kent, was killed in Syria in a suicide bombing. Kent now describes that conflict as “a war manufactured by Israel”.
Think about that. A Gold Star husband — someone who paid the ultimate price for American foreign policy — is telling us that his wife died in a war that served Israeli, not American, interests. If that doesn’t demand scrutiny, what does?
Why this matters now Critics dismiss Kent as antisemitic or claim he is leaking classified information. But ad hominem attacks don’t address the substance.
Did Israel target a negotiator actively seeking peace? Yes. Did Israel attack energy infrastructure knowing it would destabilise global markets? Yes. Does Israel have a documented 30-year strategy of military confrontation over diplomacy? Yes.
The situation in Gaza further illustrates the pattern. As one analysis noted, Netanyahu’s “ceasefire” effectively granted Israel breathing space to consolidate political control while evading accountability. Within days, Israel’s Parliament passed a bill paving the way for West Bank annexation. This isn’t peace — it’s a pause for rearmament.
The parasite metaphor A parasite feeds on its host, weakening it while appearing inseparable from it. Israel’s relationship with American foreign policy fits this description uncomfortably well.
American blood and treasure fund Israeli objectives. American credibility suffers when allies act unilaterally. American interests in stable energy markets get sacrificed for Israeli security concerns.
Joe Kent’s accusations deserve more than reflexive dismissal. They deserve investigation. Because if a Gold Star husband and former counterterrorism chief is correct — if Israel is indeed sabotaging peace for its own ends — then Americans have a right to know why their soldiers are dying and their markets are destabilised for another nation’s strategic objectives.
The description of Israel as a parasite may be harsh. But sometimes harsh truths are the only ones that break through comfortable lies.
Israel has positioned itself as America’s indispensable ally. Kent’s resignation suggests it may actually be the parasite draining American power while sabotaging any chance of Middle Eastern peace.
Marcus Alexanderis an independent writer in Doha and contributor to Channel Media Network.
The Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands’ (CNMI) economic struggles are not just a local issue, but a matter of strategic importance to American operations in the Indo-Pacific, say senior US military leaders.
In a letter, dated 25 February 2026, Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command, said he shared concerns raised by CNMI leaders about worsening economic conditions and their broader implications.
“The security and stability of the CNMI are of vital strategic importance,” Paparo wrote, warning that the islands’ civilian infrastructure and community wellbeing were “inextricably linked” to the US military’s ability to operate in the region.
He said he had directed staff to analyse proposals put forward by CNMI officials, but noted the requested federal actions fall outside his authority.
Paparo said he would elevate the issues to agencies including State, Commerce, Transportation and Homeland Security.
Paparo also backed calls for direct engagement with the White House, saying he supported “an executive-level dialogue with the Administration” and was prepared to take part.
“We are committed to the security and prosperity of the CNMI,” he said.
Expanding US presence At the same time, military officials say an expanding US presence across the Marianas could provide longer-term economic opportunities — though not an immediate fix.
Speaking at a Saipan Chamber of Commerce forum on March 11, Rear-Admiral Brett Meitus of Joint Region Marianas said more than US$500 million in projects were underway, with additional development planned, particularly on Tinian.
“It’s going to happen over the course of several years . . . we just don’t have the capacity to do it all at once,” he said.
Meitus said the military was trying to move beyond a short-term construction surge toward a longer cycle of “build, sustain, and operate,” aimed at creating ongoing economic activity.
“Just as important is how we sustain it . . . making sure that what we build looks like it should a year, two years, five years, ten years from now,” he said.
He said future operations-including exercises and deployments-are expected to bring spending into the local economy as visiting personnel stay in hotels and patronise businesses.
“When forces come in . . . they can spend money on the local economy,” he said.
Potential benefits Meitus also pointed to potential benefits including expanded land leases, increased exercises, more port visits and service member tourism, while acknowledging that coordination across different military branches is still evolving.
“We’re working hard to get our arms around exactly how we want to do it,” he said.
He added that the goal is to move from a project-driven boost to more sustained participation by local businesses, though he acknowledged it would not fully address the CNMI’s economic challenges.
Both leaders emphasised the need for continued engagement with federal partners, framing the CNMI’s economic outlook as closely tied to US strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific.
This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.
Westerners are about to start paying a lot more attention to the war in Iran as massive US-Israeli escalations point to a coming energy crisis set to impact on the whole world.
Now that a major red line for Tehran has been crossed, retaliatory strikes have already begun pummeling the energy infrastructure of US allies in the region, with Qatar reporting that its primary gas facility has sustained “significant damage” from an attack after Iran issued evacuation warnings for energy facilities in Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Fuel prices are already surging. If Middle Eastern energy infrastructure starts taking extensive damage on top of the already hugely significant Iranian blockade on the Strait of Hormuz, this war could end up affecting virtually every corner of human civilisation in one way or another.
Westerners are largely apathetic about US military explosives landing on populations on other continents. But once it starts having a direct impact on their personal bank accounts, you can expect them to get a lot more interested in US foreign policy.
This war has been a bit odd for me because as an anti-imperialist peacemonger I’m not yet entirely sure what my role is in my commentary here.
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Normally I’d be begging Westerners to care about another horrific act by the US war machine, but as things stand it looks like Westerners are going to be forced to care about this one whether they want to or not.
Normally I’d be writing furiously about how people should not support this war, but the war has exceptionally low public support already.
Normally I’d be trying to help everyone open their eyes and recognise the US warmongers for the psychopaths that they are, but the Trumpanyahu administration is openly waging an unprovoked war of aggression while constantly thumping its chest and boasting about how it’s showing the Iranians “no quarter, no mercy” and saying it can kill whoever it wants with impunity.
Normally I’d be writing about how the mass media are churning out war propaganda to manufacture consent for more US military butchery, but the mass media keep putting out stories about how the US government is lying about a war that should never have happened while Trump administration figures have public tantrums about how the media isn’t churning out war propaganda for them.
President Trump is on social media babbling about how news outlets “should be brought up on Charges for TREASON” for not reporting on an embarrassing story about a US aircraft carrier fire the way he wants, while Secretary of War Pete Hegseth gave one of his fire-and-brimstone podium sermons bitching about how “an actual patriotic press” would be framing this war in a more positive light.
Do you see what I mean? What am I supposed to do with this? Where does that leave dissident fringesters like myself? All I can do is clear my throat and sheepishly go “Uh, yeah, I uh . . . agree with CNN.”
With Ukraine the mass media fell all over themselves to hide the West’s role in provoking the conflict, framing Putin as an evil maniacal Hitler figure who just spontaneously flipped out and invaded a country on Russia’s border because he hates freedom.
With Gaza the Western press gave nonstop narrative cover to Israel’s genocidal atrocities, constantly dragging public attention into an endless conversation about antisemitism and Jewish feelings whenever opposition to the slaughter got too hot.
That’s just not happening with Iran. It’s the first US war I’ve ever seen where a big chunk of the imperial power structure just refuses to get on board. The media’s not playing along, US allies are telling Trump to get stuffed when he asks for military assistance with the Strait of Hormuz, and the public’s not buying the lies.
This is a frightening time to be alive — but you can’t say we’re in a period of stasis. Things are moving faster and faster.
They might get a whole lot worse. They might get a whole lot better. They might get a whole lot worse and then get a whole lot better. But it seems a safe bet that the situation won’t remain the same.
We are now three weeks into the war between the United States, Israel and Iran, which has grown to engulf much of the Middle East. There are few signs the conflict will slow down or stop anytime soon.
For airlines, these factors mean higher operating costs and reduced capacity. For many travellers, that means fewer options and higher prices.
Some travellers may be in a position to revise, delay or cancel upcoming travel plans. But many others who need to fly for work or personal reasons face high costs or may even be considering complex, unorthodox routes.
There are some important implications for how global air travel functions, right now and in the future. But there are also some general practical tips for ordinary travellers to help navigate the uncertainty.
Fuel costs aren’t the only factor. For Australians looking to travel to or through the Middle East, the removal of millions of airline seats from flight schedules has pushed serious demand onto other routes.
Unsurprisingly, many major airlines have hiked their international fares significantly. And they may go up further still. Qantas, for instance, this week said it would review its international airfares every two weeks.
Some tickets have appeared at an extraordinarily high price. Cathay Pacific attracted attention for advertising business class tickets from Sydney to London (via Hong Kong) for close to A$40,000 return.
This is obviously very expensive. However, it is a natural result of the way most airlines use “dynamic pricing”. In essence, airlines are trying to identify (typically by analysing your flight searches) the highest price you’re willing to pay, so they can sell you a ticket at that price.
In a crisis, some might see this as taking advantage of vulnerable passengers. But airlines could argue the system ensures there is a seat there for someone who desperately needs it.
Unfortunately, they rely on the price consumers are willing to pay to demonstrate that level of “need”.
Stuck in a holding pattern
More broadly, the conflict has dramatically altered airlines’ ability to predict their costs. That’s a problem, because seats are usually for sale up to nearly a year in advance.
Will we see a shift in popular flight routes around the world if this conflict drags on? It’s hard to say.
The Middle East is geographically well-positioned to access nearly the entire world with a non-stop flight. It sits at the intersection of several popular international travel corridors, and its airline ownership models typically include government backing (which can help carriers stay operationally and financially stable).
However, if this conflict threatens those advantages in the long term, other airlines may step in, perhaps able to lower their fares over time by boosting their capacity.
The Middle East is home to some of the world’s biggest travel hubs, such as Dubai International Airport.Adam Schreck/AP
Going the longer way around
Airlines based in Asia are particularly well placed to serve Australians travelling to Europe, though high demand for these routes has driven up airfares.
Another option is to sequence together multiple tickets on different carriers. This can lower costs and may add an element of “adventure”.
However, there are some significant risks that could undo any cost savings. For one, the “extras” can really add up. A sequence of self-organised tickets often means additional expenses for:
overnight transits
multiple baggage fees
more meals on the road.
Travellers should also be mindful of visa requirements in transit countries, and any visa fees that apply.
Crucially, the “do-it-yourself” approach often means you are not protected from the impacts of delays or cancellations across multiple tickets on different airlines.
For those who are planning travel in the next couple of months, most carriers based in the Middle East are selling tickets with a reduced flight schedule to accommodate operational restrictions.
But given ongoing uncertainty, these schedules may not be as reliable as passengers would typically expect.
Buying flexible fares and travel insurance can help alleviate the effects of travel disruptions. But they introduce added costs.
What about those already booked, but anxious about whether they’ll be able to fly? Some airlines have cancellation or rebooking policies for passengers affected by the conflict for travel within a specified window of time.
Airlines may offer fee waivers, free rebooking or penalty-free cancellations.
But those whose dates aren’t eligible shouldn’t proactively cancel their flights themselves. Waiting for the airline to formally say, “we can’t take you there” gives you the best chance of ensuring it remains responsible for rebooking, a refund and other accommodations.
Israel’s bombing of Iran’s South Pars gas field has sent shockwaves through global energy markets.
The South Pars gas field is part of the world’s largest gas field, known as North Dome, shared by Iran and Qatar.
Until now, nations on both sides of the conflict have confined their attacks to civilian infrastructure, where the damage is unlikely to affect critical services.
But Israel’s attack on South Pars, and Iran’s retaliatory strike on Qatari gas infrastructure, represents a major escalation in the Middle East conflict.
So why is energy infrastructure being targeted? And how might this affect global energy prices?
Remind me, who’s attacking who?
Israel has been vocal about its campaign to destroy critical infrastructure, such as electricity and water services, as a way to cripple Iran, both economically and militarily.
Earlier this week, Israeli forces bombed the South Pars gas field, a crucial part of Iran’s domestic energy sector. South Pars accounts for about 70% of the country’s total gas production and 90% of its domestic energy use. It’s also a key processing site for Iranian gas exports, which mainly go to Turkey and Iraq.
The bombing of the South Pars gas field is the first time either side of the US-Iran conflict has attacked energy infrastructure used to produce fossil fuels.
Within hours of the South Pars attack, Iran launched a retaliatory missile strike on Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City. Ras Laffan is the world’s largest liquefied natural gas facility, producing about 20% of global supplies. Qatar primarily exports reserves from Ras Laffan to China and Europe.
According to QatarEnergy, the country’s state-owned petroleum company, the damage from Iran’s strike has reduced its processing capacity by about 17% and will potentially cut its revenue by US$20 billion. It will likely take between three and five years for the site to become fully operational again.
In the days since, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has apparently agreed not to attack any more Iranian energy infrastructure, at the request of US President Donald Trump. In a social media post, the president suggested he did not know Israel was planning to target Iranian gas infrastructure.
How will these attacks affect global energy markets?
On a regional level, the South Pars and Ras Laffan attacks have escalated already heightened tensions in the Gulf region. And it’s likely to trigger further retaliatory strikes on key energy infrastructure.
Of particular concern is Saudi Arabia’s 1,200-kilometre Yanbu oil pipeline and Abu Dhabi’s Habshan–Fujairah pipeline. Both pipelines bypass the Strait of Hormuz, allowing countries to keep exporting oil even when this crucial shipping route is closed or disrupted. But as regional tensions rise, it is unlikely the Strait of Hormuz will be opened any time soon.
From a global perspective, the impacts of the South Pars and Ras Laffan strikes are serious and far-reaching.
Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, Europe has increasingly sought to reduce its dependence on Russian gas after relying on Russian supplies for more than 25 years. As a result, Europe has turned to Qatar as its main source of liquified natural gas. So, for an already energy insecure Europe, Iran’s attack on Qatar’s Ras Laffan facility is calamitous.
The prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz is affecting economies around the world. The closure has already cut an estimated 20% of global oil supplies, and this is reflected in surging oil prices. At the time of publication, the price of brent crude oil has surpassed US$106 a barrel.
This 20% drop in global oil supplies, coupled now with the 17% loss of Qatari liquified natural gas exports, is driving this surge in oil prices. But perceived oil and gas shortages are also contributing. And the threat of further attacks on energy infrastructure will only reinforce this perception.
These strikes will not only impact fuel prices. The International Monetary Fund has already warned if oil prices remain elevated for more than a year, this will boost global inflation and slow economic growth. This would also raise the price of as crucial commodities such as food and fertiliser.
What does this mean for Australian fuel prices?
When it comes to gas, the recent strikes on Middle East energy infrastructure may have little effect on Australia. This is because we produce the vast majority of the gas we consume.
However, oil is a different story. Here in Australia, we import almost all our oil. So surging oil prices, exacerbated by Israel and Iran’s latest attacks, will likely increase the cost of almost every commodity.
Australian farmers are already bearing the brunt of fertiliser shortages, with many struggling to sow or harvest their crops. And many people, in Australia and around the world, are facing higher fuel, food, energy, and transport costs.
This raises the broader, but no less urgent, question of whether Australia has enough liquid fuel to survive such crises. Over the past decade, refinery closures, poor oil production and the transfer of our strategic oil reserve to the US have weakened our liquid fuel security.
We currently have enough liquid fuel, which includes petrol, diesel, and aviation fuel, to last just over a month. This may be adequate in peacetime. But that’s unlikely to be the case in times of disruption or, as we are now experiencing, war.
When Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, was assassinated in the opening stages of the US-Israeli war against Iran, I didn’t mourn.
Khamenei was not someone who deserved to be mourned notwithstanding my contempt for the increasing use of assassination by aggressor nations; in this case the United States and Israel.
Having said this, had either US President Donald Trump or Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu been assassinated I would have “not mourned” them even more.
On the other hand, along with thousands of residents in the Iranian city of Minab a mass funeral, I did privately mourn for the at least 165 schoolgirls and staff killed in the opening hours of the US-Israeli strikes when one of their missiles hit a girls’ elementary school.
Two words distinguish Iran from United States and Israel Understanding what distinguishes Iran from both the United States and Israel begins with two uncomplimentary words — repression and genocide.
Repression is the action of subduing someone or something by force. This can include suppressing thoughts or desires in people so that they remain unconscious. Iran’s theocratic political system is unquestionably repressive.
If, in some way, you question the regime or the governing values enough there is a high risk of repression. Keep your head down and you are likely to be safe. If not then you are likely to be in danger.
In contrast, genocide is the deliberate and systematic killing or persecution of a large number of people from a particular national or ethnic group with the aim of destroying that nation or group.
Bodies on display at Murambi memorial site on February 23, 2003 in Murambi outside Gikongoro, Rwanda. About 800.000 mainly Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in about one hundred days in 1994, and about 100.000 prisoners accused of the genocide are still in prison awaiting trial. Rwanda is currently trying to cope with these huge problems and some prisoners that confessed to crimes can be tried in village trials, known as Gacacas.
” data-medium-file=”https://politicalbytes.blog/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/genocide-getty.jpg?w=300″ data-large-file=”https://politicalbytes.blog/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/genocide-getty.jpg?w=612″/>Bodies on display at Murambi memorial site on February 23, 2003 in Murambi outside Gikongoro, Rwanda. About 800,000 mainly Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in about 100 days in 1994, and about 100.000 prisoners accused of the genocide are still in prison awaiting trial. Rwanda is currently trying to cope with these huge problems. Image: politicalbytes.blog
Genocide a characteristic of Israel and US government policies Israel’s policy of the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from their homeland now incorporates genocide as the main means of achieving this objective, particularly in Gaza which is there for all to observe.
While Israel is the practitioner of genocide in Gaza, the United States is the enabler and main funder. This is in terms of both funding weapons supplies and political support for Israel’s brutal military occupation of this small remaining piece of Palestinian land.
Without this US support there would be no genocide in Gaza; like the West Bank, just ongoing repression.
While it is right to condemn repressive actions by the Iranian government, it is mindbogglingly immoral for these genocide supporting governments to make any judgment call on Iran, let alone declare war on the country.
Understanding the Islamic Republic As discussed above, the Islamic Republic is a repressive government towards those who oppose it in some public way. But repression is not its only characteristic.
Iran comprises a diversity of ethnicities and religions. Image: politicalbytes.blog
Iran is a highly diverse nation. While 61 percent of its population are Persian, there are more than 20 ethnic groups in total. Major minority groups include Azeris (16-24 percent), Kurds (7-10 percent), Lurs (2-6 percent), Baloch (2 percent), Arabs (1-3 percent) and Turkmens (2 percent).
As many as 99 percent of Iranians in the Republic are Muslim, predominantly Shia (90-95 percent) with the remainder comprising the Sunni minority.
While the Islamic Republic state is dominated by Shia Islam, there are recognised minority religions which are granted reserved parliamentary seats. These include Christianity, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism.
An exception is the Baháʼí faith, a world religion was founded in the 19th century mainly in Iran. It may be the second largest non-Muslim religion in the country.
Many Iranian Baháʼí have a previous Muslim background and are subjected to persecution. However, this is an inherited persecution that goes back to the mid-19th century.
Iran is not repressive towards minority ethnic groups because of their ethnicity. Azeris, for example, are not repressed because they are Azeris; only if they “put their heads above the barricades” so to speak.
The same can be said for Sunni Muslims and non-Muslim religions, except for Baháʼí whose repression is historical, predating the Islamic Republic by over a century.
But if the Republic is only seen as despotic, then an entire historical legacy explaining so much more than this is lost.
Iran is home to one of the world’s oldest continuous major civilisations, with historical and urban settlements dating back to the 5th century BC.
In spite of invasions by foreign powers, such as the Greeks, Arabs, Turks, and Mongols, the Iranian national identity was repeatedly asserted and preserved despite several changes in its dynastic empires.
The Pahlavi dynasty legacy In 1925, Reza Khan established the Pahlavi (and last) dynasty. Following a military coup he became the new dynasty’s first Shah. In 1941, however, he was overthrown with his son Mohammad-Reza becoming the second and last Pahlavi Shah.
Initially there were hopes of a constitutional monarchy. However, in 1951. Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq got sufficient parliamentary support to nationalise the British-owned oil industry.
In response, Mosaddeq was briefly removed from power in 1952. But, due to a popular uprising in support of him, he was quickly but reluctantly reappointed by the Shah. This enabled Mosaddeq to briefly exile the Shah in 1953 after surviving a subsequent failed military coup.
However, in August 1953, Mosaddeq was deposed by a successful US-supported military coup that was also actively supported by Britain.
The Shah then returned to power ruling Iran as a brutal autocracy with strong US support until the 1979 revolution and the Shah’s final overthrow.
Oil was central to the Shah’s policies. His government entered into agreement with an international consortium of foreign companies which ran the Iranian oil facilities for the next 25 years, splitting profits 50-50 with Iran. However, Iran was not allowed to audit the companies’ accounts or have members on their board of directors.
The Iran that the Islamic Republic inherited in 1979, on the one hand, had never been colonised; unlike much of Africa and Asia, for example. It had a proud national identity. On the other hand, under the Pahlavi dynasty, particularly in its last 25 years. it had become subservient to the United States and the oil companies.
The Shah’s autocratic regime was overthrown by a powerful mass popular movement. Among the forefront of this unstoppable movement were those that came to lead the new Islamic Republic.
The republic was the consequence of this popular will. While today there is strong internal Iranian opposition to the leadership of the Republic, there is also strong internal support for it
“Ayatollah” Donald Trump in an Oval Office religious ceremony (White House) . . . Iran isn’t the only “theocracy”. Image: politicalbytes.blog
In 1979, Iran’s political system had changed from an autocracy to a theocracy. But there was more to it than this.
The hated legacy, under the last Shah, of the interests of Iranians being subservient to that of US imperialism, was powerful. In no small part this shaped the Islamic Republic’s politics. It was reinforced by US support for Iraq’s protected war against Iran in the 1980s.
Further, whereas the Shah held openly expressed racist views on Arabs, the republic saw it differently.
In particular, it intuitively supported Palestinian self-determination which put it at odds with Zionist Israel.
Iran also empathised with countries with quite different political systems, such as secular Cuba, that had been subjected to continuing US hostility and shared Iran’s antipathy towards US imperialism and supported for Palestine.
While your enemy’s enemy may not be your friend, nevertheless there may be principled shared interests.
Understanding the United States and its imperialism Imperialism put simply is a policy of extending a powerful country’s economic power, exploitation of, and influence over other countries. Historically this has been through colonisation, invariably by the use of military force.
Historically the biggest imperialist power was the British Empire which, by the early 20th century, included much of Africa and Asia (and beyond).
The United States is now the world’s strongest imperialist power.
The United States began as an imperialist power in the early 20th century, particularly in Central America, the Caribbean, and the Philippines. Since the Second World War it has become, by far, the biggest imperial power reinforced by the most powerful military.
Put simply, capitalism is an economic system relentlessly driven by the maximisation of wealth accumulation. Imperialism is the highest and most extensive form of capitalism.
In this context, particularly since 1953, Iran under the Pahlavi dynasty was a complicit pawn willingly exploited by US imperialism.
This ended in 1979 by the popular will that led to the establishment of the Islamic Republic; something US imperialism has never forgiven and the republic has never forgotten.
In other words, the US-Islamic Republic relationship is a recipe for continuous conflict and has reached its highest point with the current US-Israel initiated war.
False confusing justifications for the US-Israel war The failure of the United States (and Israel) to acknowledge the above discussed escalating conflict to the point of outright war between them and the Islamic Republic has led to their muddled and changing false justifications for the war.
The truth of the matter is that the war centres on the republic’s firm opposition to US imperialism and support for Palestinian self-determination. The use of deceitful justifications is a public relations attempt to fudge this truth.
One false argument is that Iran was close to developing nuclear weapons. However, in the short war last June, the US and Israel boasted that they destroyed Iran’s nuclear weapons capability.
What is the lie — what they said then or what they now say? More likely it is both. After all Israel is the only country possessing nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Further, unlike Iran, it isn’t a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In fact, there is only one nuclear power in Middle East — Israel. But while Israel is ignored, Iran hypocritically is the focus of deceitful accusations and intense pressure, and now war.
Another false justification is that the US, in particular, wants to save Iranian lives by ending the repression. It is barely worth the time rejecting this claim from supporters and practitioners of genocide.
Further their bombing has already killed more than 1400 Iranians (a reported 30 percent are children) and rising. More than 17,000 have been injured including over 1000 children. Hypocrisy at its peak.
A related occasional justification is restoring democracy. But the Islamic Republic is more democratic than the outright autocracy it replaced and no less democratic than the ruthless US ally Saudi Arabia; admittedly they are both low thresholds.
Joe Kent’s resignation as Director of the National Counterterrorism Centre has severely damaged Trump’s credibility. Image: politicalbytes.blog
Perhaps the most damming indictment of the claimed justifications is the recent resignation of Donald Trump’s Director of the National Counterterrorism Centre, Joe Kent.
Explaining this dramatic decision, Kent referred to his concerns about the justification for military strikes in Iran. These included that, despite Trump’s claims, there was no imminent threat from Iran and that the US was “manipulated” by Israel.
Consequently Kent advised that he “cannot in good conscience” back the Trump administration’s war against Iran. Both optimistically and bravely he urged the President to end it.
In fact, Trump’s disingenuousness and underestimation of the strength of Iranian resistance and fightback have made a ceasefire improbable for some time.
Iran already agreed to a ceasefire in June. But the US and Israel broke it even though diplomacy discussions were underway.
US, Israel can’t be trusted Why would Iran agree to another ceasefire just to give the US and Israel enough time to regroup and start another war against a combative but weakened Iran.
Iran now believes that the US and Israel can’t be trusted and it would be better to try to further weaken them instead. After all, what does Iran have to lose!
Words like reaping and sowing come to mind!
Since the mid-1980s successful New Zealand governments have had an independent foreign policy.
US-Israel war against Iran has implications for New Zealand’s economic recovery. Cartoon: Slane, Listener
However, especially under the current government, we have drifted back towards being aligned with our former position of being a United States lapdog.
This observable drift was further escalated by the government’s response through Prime Minister Christopher Luxon (in an embarrassingly mashed way) and Foreign Minister Winston Peters.
US military bases located around Iran. Map: politicalbytes.blog
In summary, while maintaining a loud silence on the US-Israeli bombing of Iran, they condemned Iran’s own bombing response in those neighbouring Arab countries with US military bases.
These US bases would be akin to Iran having its own military bases in Canada and/or Mexico (perhaps Cuba; just saying).
There has been considered media coverage of the government’s response to the war beginning with Bryce Edwards’ Democracy Briefing (March 1): How should NZ respond to the US bombing Iran.
Christopher Luxon fumbles and flounders in toe-cringingly style
To complete this considered coverage was international relations expert Professor Robert Patman, also in Newsroom (March 3): Risky Iran attack gamble.
However, it took former Prime Minister Helen Clark to demonstrate the type of political leadership we deserved to have (having herself demonstrated this over the disastrous US-led war in Iraq nearly two decades ago).
Her uncompromising criticism of the government’s response included calling it a “disgrace” (March 1): Government response a disgrace.
Being a US lapdog doesn’t protect NZ from the war on Iran. Cartoon: Emmerson, NZ Herald
While Clark didn’t use the term “lapdog” to describe the government’s position, if she had she would have been right.
Repressed by Iranian government – but terrified of regime collapse The insights of Iranians critical of the Islamic Republic’s repressive nature but even more critical of the US-Israel bombing of Iran are invaluable.
Below is an extract from a Facebook post (March 2) from an Iranian man’s YouTube channel. Consistent with the theme of my comments above, this Iranian expresses the paradox Iranians involuntarily now find themselves in — caught between an internal repressive regime and external narcissistic warmongers.
In his words:
“As an Iranian, I can tell you the situation is no longer just political — it’s existential. We are trapped between two collapsing structures: one internal, one external. On one hand, we face a deeply dysfunctional government, led by the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Republic’s unelected institutions.
“Decades of economic mismanagement, suppression of dissent, and brutal ideological control have alienated multiple generations. No one believes in reform anymore — because every attempt has either been co-opted or crushed.
“But here’s the paradox: We are also terrified of regime collapse — because we’ve watched the aftermath of Western intervention in countries like Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan. Each was promised freedom; each descended into chaos, civil war, or foreign occupation.
“So no, we don’t trust the US or Israel. Not because we support our regime — but because we know how imperial powers treat ‘”liberated” nations in the Middle East.
“Freedom, in their language, often means vacuum, fire, and permanent instability. Right now, many Iranians live with three truths at once: The Islamic Republic is morally and politically bankrupt. The alternatives offered by foreign actors are not liberation — they’re collapse.
“A bad government is survivable. No government is not. We are not silent because we agree. We are cautious because we’ve learned — too well — what happens when superpowers decide to “help”.
“In a sentence: Iran is a nation held hostage by its own regime, but haunted by the fate of its neighbors. We are stuck in a house we hate, surrounded by fires we fear more.”
The final word — and what a word it is Sahar Delijani is an Iranian American author most known for her internationally acclaimed debut novel, Children of the Jacaranda Tree. It has been translated into 32 languages and published in more than 75 countries.
In her own courageous and insightful words:
I was born in an Iranian prison. My parents were held in their jails. My uncles lie in their mass graves.
Nothing you can tell be about the crimes of the Iranian regime that I haven’t lived in blood and bone.
That does not mean that I want my people bombed, maimed, killed, their homes in ruins.
If your vision of liberation is only through the destruction of innocent lives, then it’s not freedom you’re after.
These words are more than eloquence; more than heart rendering. They convert complexity into simplicity; they are powerful; they speak truth to power.
They deserve to be the last word in this article.
Ian Powell is a progressive health, labour market and political “no-frills” forensic commentator in New Zealand. A former senior doctors union leader for more than 30 years, he blogs at Second Opinion and Political Bytes, where this article was first published. Republished with the author’s permission.
Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Susan M. Sawyer, Professor of Adolescent Health The University of Melbourne; Director, Royal Children’s Hospital Centre for Adolescent Health; and Murdoch Children’s Research Institute, The University of Melbourne
Australia’s world-first national legislation to restrict access to social media accounts for children under 16 years old has been in force for about three months. New data from a survey of 1,070 Australian adults provides tantalising evidence of some positive effects.
The YouGov survey found many parents had noticed several positive behavioural shifts in their children aged 16 and under since the law took effect on December 10 2025. This, however, wasn’t universal, with some parents also reporting negative changes in their children’s behaviour.
So what exactly do the results of the survey show? And how should they be interpreted?
A first step
Before we can assess any effect of the legislation in preventing online harms we need to know whether the age-assurance processes are working.
Initial figures gathered by Australia’s eSafety Commission indicated social media platforms had removed 4.7 million accounts of children under 16 last December.
This figure reportedly includes a number of inactive and duplicate accounts. As a result, it may not be an accurate representation of the actual number of young people affected.
Young people are also reportedly circumventing age verification restrictions. And a report by Crikey, based on new data by parental control company Qustodio, showed social media usage among under-16s had dropped only marginally in the first three months of the ban.
Parents see some positive impacts
The YouGov survey took place online on January 12–14 this year – a little over a month after social media age restrictions took effect.
Among parents of children under 16 years old, 61% observed between two and four positive effects. Some 43% noticed more in-person social interactions, while 38% said their children were more present and engaged during interactions and 38% reported improved parent-child relationships.
But these parents also reported negative impacts. Some 27% noted a shift to alternative or less regulated platforms. And 25% observed reduced social connection, creativity or peer support online.
Two thirds of adults in this survey believed greater parental involvement could make the ban more effective. And 56% agreed stricter enforcement and age verification would improve its effectiveness.
This suggests many parents understand the complex challenges around implementation of effective age-assurance processes.
Limitations of the survey
Disappointingly, the proportion of parents in the YouGov sample is not reported, nor is the exact age of their children.
Given the survey took place in the middle of the summer holidays, it is hard to know what contribution this may have had, as social media use generally declines then.
We also do not know whether the reported behavioural changes were observed among young people who had been “kicked off” their social media accounts.
We are involved in an ongoing study that aims to evaluate the impact of social media age restrictions. This study directly measures how much time young people actually spend on different social media apps using passive sensing technology, in addition to more common self-reported questionnaires.
Our baseline data (collected before the new rules came into effect) from 171 young people counters the prevailing narrative that “all teens are against the social media restrictions”.
In fact, 40% of 13–16-year-olds were either supportive of or indifferent to the legislation, suggesting a more nuanced examination is warranted.
Young people also showed insights into their own experiences of using social media. Watching short videos was the most frequently reported activity. But only 16% thought it was a good use of their time.
Australia’s eSafety Commissioner Julie Inman Grant has also committed to a comprehensive evaluation of the Social Media Minimum Age Act.
A collaboration between the eSafety Commission, Stanford University’s Social Media Lab (the lead academic partner), and an 11-member academic advisory group, this evaluation aims to assess how the minimum age requirement is being implemented and examine both intended and unintended impacts.
A major element of the eSafety evaluation is its longitudinal design over at least the next two years, with perspectives from over 4,000 young people aged 10–16 years and their parent or carer. The participants include enough young people from certain groups, such as those living in the country, or who are neurodiverse, to take a closer look at whether restricting access to social media has a disproportionate impact on them.
The eSafety evaluation will also directly track how much time young people spend on different apps and when they do so.
Measuring success in years, not months
The next few months will no doubt be the toughest for the eSafety Commissioner as she works with each of the technology platforms to ensure they are taking the “reasonable steps” required by the law.
There will be much global interest in the public compliance report that the eSafety Commission will soon release, which will detail these steps.
Technology companies face fines of up to A$49.5 million for failing to comply with the law. For many, the financial cost may be less of a concern than avoiding damage to their reputation, as evident in recent court cases in the United States where Snapchat and TikTok settled out of court.
Rather than anticipating immediate benefits in young people who have already enjoyed access to social media, we may see stronger effects in the next generation of children, whose parents are yet to provide permission for them to access social media accounts.
In this regard, the true benefit of Australia’s legislation may be whether it changes social norms among parents about the “right” age for children to have a phone and around what role social media should play in young people’s lives.
Such changes will be measured in years, not months.
Keith Rankin, trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.
The human world changed twice during the twentieth century. The first transition lasted from 1914 to 1945. The principal cause of World War Two was World War One. So, to understand the drivers of that long transition, indeed a great levelling event, it is necessary to investigate the causes of World War One. What happened between those wars was not inevitable, of course. But those inter-war events formed part of a comprehensible transitional sequence.
The next transition began, I would argue, in 1967 and lasted until 1980. Though key pre- and post-transition events took place in 1948, 1953 and 1956; and 1989/1990. The 1967 to 1980 transition significantly involved both Israel and Iran. As a result, the post-war world of cold war and decolonisation gave way to a neoliberal world order in which the new financial and political elites increasingly ruled under the titular covers of ‘liberal democracy’, ‘global rules-based-order’, and the ‘unipolar moment‘.
Are we today in a new transition, away from neoliberalism; maybe into a bleak zero-sum order (or negative-sum) of right-wing identity politics? An order in which national or cultural identity groups seek to harm other such groups more than they benefit their own group. An ultra-Hobbesian world in which individuals and groups gain pleasure directly from the pain they cause to others? Or will such gratuitous and predatory behaviour be limited to a transition now under way? While such behaviour happened markedly during the last years of the 1914 to 1945 transition, there were also substantial precursors to it in the lead-up to World War One. Not least the Judeophobic pogroms in Ukraine and some of its neighbouring territories.
These remain open questions. My aim here is to outline the 1967 to 1980 transition, noting some parallels between that transition and present times.
Before that, I’ll just mention that, in 1948, Israel and Palestine were both granted, by the new United Nations, the status of sovereign nation states. The Palestine nation was stillborn, for a number of reasons, one of which was that the eventual borders of Israel split the Palestinian territories. And I’ll mention that, in 1953, the United States instigated a political and military coup in Iran, converting a developing independent democracy into an absolute monarchy whose role was to acquiesce to Washington’s stated and unstated interests.
Suez Canal: the First Crisis
Most wars start with a pretext, an event manufactured or exploited by the true belligerent to justify its aggression.
One country which had been subjugated – indeed occupied – by the United Kingdom for many years was Egypt. That’s why Egypt came to be so important for the New Zealand military in both WW1 and WW2.
The critical strategic asset in Egypt was the Suez Canal, built by French interests, opened in 1869, and effectively wrested by the British from 1882 (though France maintained a strategic interest). For the steamship age, that canal became the critical conduit for the British Empire, connecting London with India (which included modern Pakistan and Bangladesh), East Africa, the ‘Middle East’ (meaning the Persian Gulf), the ‘Far East’, and the Australian colonies which became Australia.
The Egyptian Revolution took place in 1952, and Egyptian president Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal in July 1956. The result was a war in the latter part of 1956, in which the British and French persuaded Israel (only created in 1948) to invade Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. (These events were covered in an episode of The Crown.) The Israeli attack took place as Operation Kadesh. Less than two days after this pretext, presented as a threat to Israel’s security, Britain (and France) started bombing Egypt at Port Said, in an operation to ‘secure’ the Canal.
The end result was an ignominious defeat for Britain and France, unsupported by the US, but with no meaningful withdrawal by Israel; the Israel-Egypt border had become permanently militarised, noting that Gaza had been (by agreement) under Egyptian control since 1949.
The Suez Canal was closed for nearly six months, until April 1957.
Suez Canal: the Second Crisis
Ten years later, in June 1967, Israel went for broke. This was the much bigger second crisis for the Suez Canal. In six days, Israel conquered the entire Sinai Peninsula – therefore including Gaza – meaning that Israel had annexed the eastern side of the Canal. In addition Israel conquered East Jerusalem, which in 1948 was supposed to have become the capital of an independent Palestine, the West Bank (which the State of Tennessee, in an act of appeasement towards Israel, now wants to call Judea and Samaria; refer Bill requiring Tennessee to use ‘Judea and Samaria’ instead of ‘West Bank’ advances, Fox17, 6 March 2026), and Syria’s Golan Heights.
The principal consequence was that the Suez Canal, an even more important waterway than the Gulf of Hormuz, was closed from 1967 to 1975.
With hindsight, we can see that the global economic crisis of the 1970s began in 1967. It is understood as a crisis of inflation which morphed after 1973 into a crisis of stagflation; for an overview, biased towards the US and towards the received narrative, refer to The Great Inflation, in Federal Reserve History.
The closure of the Suez Canal had little impact on oil prices. But it did lead to a surge in the cost of international transportation, as Asia to Europe trade had to be diverted to the South African and Panama routes. The other two drivers of that inflation-surge in the late 1960s were the escalations of the Vietnam War, and the prevalence of a corporate structure – outlined by John Kenneth Galbraith in The New Industrial State (1967) and Economics and the Public Purpose (1973) – which made the global marketplace less responsive towards increases in global spending. That last point means that large corporate firms, like today’s energy companies, became predisposed to respond to increased demand by raising prices rather than by raising the quantities of output supplied.
Wartime is almost always associated with inflation, because it both raises costs and constrains the supply of consumer goods. (American wars since the 1970s can be an exception, because they are financed by instant money and readily-available imports; by US government-deficits and US economy trade deficits. Deficits which the rest of the world is eager to facilitate.)
Israel 1967 to 1973
With the partial exception of Syria’s Golan Heights, Israel did not formally incorporate the other conquered territories. This retention of these territories as subjugated territories was partly due to international pressure to not recognise conquests, but was probably more to do with their implications for the demographic balance of Israel. Integration would have led to the possibility of Jews becoming a minority of Israel’s population, and Arabs a majority.
(We should note that, for the secular Jews who run Israel, to be Jewish is understood more as an ethnicity than as a religious faith. Hence, Israelis tend to juxtapose Jews and Arabs, whereas people in the rest of the world juxtapose Israelis (understood to be mostly Jews) and Palestinians. Israelis favour the word ‘Arab’ over ‘Palestinian’, because of a popular Israeli narrative that the indigenous population of Palestine is descended from immigrants from Arabia.)
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War happened in October 1973, beginning with a surprise attack by Egypt, during the Yom Kippur holy day (and noting that the 2026 attacks on Iran occurred during Ramadan, Islam’s holiest period). Basically, Egypt wanted its Sinai Peninsula back, in part so that it could reopen the Canal. Other nearby countries joined-in, especially Syria, but also Jordan and Iraq. Not Iran, which was then under United States hegemony.
Despite Egypt’s initial advantage of surprise, Israel not only fought back defensively, but counterattacked. The counterattack included an Israeli army contingent crossing the Suez Canal and marching on Cairo; ie approaching the Nile River. Potentially this war could have led to the creation of a Greater Israel; from the Euphrates (in Syria and Iraq) to the Nile. But again, the problem of conquest becomes the problem of having to incorporate supposedly ‘inferior’ populations into the expanded nation state.
(We note that surprise attacks often do not bear fruit; noting the American president’s tasteless and quasi-triumphant comparison between 28 February 2026 with the ultimately unsuccessful attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. See Trump jokes about Pearl Harbour in meeting with Japan’s PM, TVNZ, 20 March 2026. For a brief moment, I wondered if the President was going to refer to the surprise attack of 6 August 1945, or that of 10 March 1945.)
Further, the international community had interests other than appeasing Israel. The biggest of these concerns was the price of oil. In the end the international community got its way, but at a cost of making Israel itself into a significantly more belligerent state than it had been hitherto.
Oil Prices
The 1973 Oil Crisis led to a quadrupling of crude oil prices by 1977, most of that taking place in 1974. Given the general inflation, much of it instigated by the oil price increases, real oil prices only increased by 150 percent in United States’ dollars.
The main reasons for the huge price increases of oil were the roles of the likes of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – through the Vienna-based OPEC cartel – being able to push back against the encroachment of the Zionist project in their region, by using their effective near-monopoly power. In turn, these high prices led to the further development of the petroleum industries in the Persian Gulf, and of the Gulf States themselves. Additionally, we should note that oil was underpriced prior to the 1973 war; much as it can be argued that oil was underpriced in January 2026.
This had a much bigger economic impact on countries like New Zealand than anything we’ve either seen or projected in the present March 2026 crisis. (In my case, it brought forward my OE plans. At the end of 1973, for $400 I bought a ticket to sail to England via Acapulco, Panama, Curaçao and Barbados. By time the ship sailed in April 1974, the fare had been subject to two surcharges and I ended up paying more like $480. It could have been worse if the ship had not had access to cheap Venezuelan fuel in Curaçao.)
The result was a series of massive financial imbalances across the world; between oil-importing and oil-exporting countries, and also within larger oil-producing countries such as the United States. (New York’s loss was Texas’s gain.) While those 1970s’ financial challenges were navigated by the world’s finance ministers and central banks with a large measure of pragmatic success, the turmoil of the times let in a new and simplistic narrative around money and inflation; an unnuanced narrative that harked back to the classical stories about money during World War Zero (that’s the Napoleonic Wars of 1798 to 1815).
That new narrative was monetarism/neoliberalism, and placed itself perfectly to exploit the economic crisis – the Great Inflation– to create the neoliberal anti-intellectual hegemony which has ruled over the western world and hence over the whole world since the early 1980s. The guru of monetarism was a Chicago School economist; Milton Friedman. As an academic, Friedman and his acolytes had been plugging away through the 1950s and 1960s; well-placed to take advantage of a good crisis, especially a crisis centred around the word ‘inflation’. Chicago School economists experimented on Chile following its 11 September 1973 military coup.
If Israel had simply returned Sinai to Egypt in say 1970 – in circumstances similar to the eventual return of Sinai – allowing the Suez Canal to reopen, then the 1970s and 1980s could have turned out very differently.
Revolution, and Oil Prices again
One of the consequences of the political crisis in the Middle East was further crisis in the Middle East. Various latent nationalisms in the region intensified markedly; these intensifications turned for inspiration to the common faith in the region, Islam.
Hence, there was a direct – albeit convoluted – pathway from the 1973 war to the 1978/1979 Iranian Revolution. In February 1979 the Imperial State of Iran gave way to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
(I could have gained a personal glimpse of revolutionary Iran. Returning from my OE in September 1978, my partner and I were on a PanAm flight from Rome to Istanbul. The flight originated in New York, and terminated in Tehran, and was running late. Many of the passengers were agitated, because the flight was now projected to arrive in Tehran during the evening curfew. I guess it was always possible that PanAm would take the decision to overfly Istanbul, in order to arrive in Tehran on time. The plane did land in Istanbul, later than scheduled, so I know not about what dramas may have unfolded in Tehran later that evening. I expect that the return flight out of Tehran was fully booked, given the deteriorating situation there for American citizens.)
An important result is that oil from Iran, a founding member of OPEC, came off the world market for a few years. (Although, Aotearoa New Zealand, in its own pragmatic navigation of the crisis, came to do a swap deal with Revolutionary Iran. Despite the fact that, for a few years instances of capital punishment in Iran came to exceed those in the United States, New Zealand negotiated a sheep-meat for oil swap, thereby saving this country’s critical sheep-farming industry.)
The result of the loss of Iranian oil from the word market led, in 1979, to a further doubling of the world price of crude oil. In the second half of the 1970s, many countries – including New Zealand and United States – cut their speed limits to 80kph (or 50 miles per hour). (I still remember, in October 1976, riding in a Greyhound Bus in Pennsylvania, watching big trucks traveling very slowly along the United States’ interstate motorway system.)
In 1979, the crisis became so difficult that the New Zealand government made the sensible though since-derided decision to ration petrol by requiring motorists to observe carless days each week.
Governments in oil-importing countries made the pragmatic decision to both conserve oil and, for balance of payments’ reasons, to develop their own oil, gas and exportable reserves. New Zealand electrified its North Island Main Trunk Railway, doubled its aluminium production capacity (in order to export renewable energy), substantially expanded its oil-refining capacity, developed the Maui gas field; and developed the Glenbrook steel mill as a means to gain export receipts from the sale of west coast iron-sand.
Eventually, in 1986, the world oil price collapsed, ushering in a new (and environmentally discordant) era of cheap oil. Inflation-adjusted oil prices in 1999 were even lower than in 1972.
The Great Deception
World price-inflation was on a substantial downward path once the leading economies’ central banks allowed interest rates to fall (through liberalising monetary policies) in the years 1983 to 1985, and once cheap oil resumed. But in some countries high consumer-price-inflation persevered until the end of the 1980s’ decade, especially as they shifted towards goods and services taxes.
New Zealand pioneered a particular form of illiberal monetary policy in 1989, when inflation was already falling back to normal levels; and claimed that the new simple-minded monetary policy was the sole cure. This policy, which was in fact very much associated with the aforementioned monetarist project, became akin to a biblical truth; and was successfully exported to the consolidating globalised political and financial elites, making this new quasi-biblical truth into a bedrock policy-of-faith in the post-1980 world order.
Today, we can easily observe how false this ‘truth’ of faith is. By looking at the United Kingdom and Australia, two countries which have minimally reduced interest rates since 2022, we can see how their inflation rates have remained stubbornly higher than those with lower interest rates.
The next political and financial world order?
Are we in a new transition? Probably yes. Will it take a decade or so? Probably yes. While there are many calamities that could happen – and remembering that the world faced the possibility of global nuclear war early in both the cold war world order and the neoliberal world order – an optimistic take is that the world will move into a multipolar principles-of-engagement world order in which no single polity (or alliance) can dictate terms to the rest of the world with apparent impunity.
A unipolar world order is an illiberal geopolitical monopoly. Present events may either entrench or destroy the forces pushing for geopolitical illiberalism. Multipolarity is geopolitical liberalism.
The next world order should not be reliant on cheap oil nor indefinite economic growth nor the idolatry of money. Money is a means, not an end; it is a technology, not a commodity. Capitalism can become a peaceful private-public partnership. If enough of us want it to be.
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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.
