MIL-OSI Export

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Mireille Rebeiz, Chair of Middle East Studies, Dickinson College

A chorus of hawkish Israeli politicians is urging the country’s military to intensify its weekslong ground and air campaign against Hezbollah and pave the way for a more permanent presence in the country’s south.

On April 5, 18 Israeli lawmakers pressed the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to occupy and fully control southern Lebanon up to the Litani River and “evacuate” the Lebanese population there. It followed an earlier call from Israel’s Finance Minister Bezalel Yoel Smotrich, a powerful, extremist voice in the ruling coalition for the outright annexation of southern Lebanon.

Alongside such voices, Israel’s campaign shows no signs of slowing down. That’s despite a two-week ceasefire announced by President Donald Trump on April 7 that paused the U.S. and Israel’s war in Iran and that, according to mediators, was meant to apply to Lebanon as well.

Those calling for an enlarged Israel that includes parts of Lebanon tend to shroud their ideology in religious rhetoric. Yet the view is hardly isolated to the hawkish, religious far-right. It is also nothing new. As a scholar who specializes in Middle East studies, I believe that the policy of occupying and annexing south Lebanon up to the Litani River has long held influence among parts of the Israeli government and dates back to influential Zionist leaders – secular and religious alike – before Israeli independence in 1948.

History suggests were that goal to be pursued in the course of Israel’s military campaign now, however, it would only destabilize Lebanon further, encourage regional turmoil and do little to guarantee Israel’s safety.

Early Zionism and south Lebanon

In 1918, David Ben-Gurion – an early Zionist leader and widely regarded as Israel’s founding father – argued that Israel’s natural borders included parts of modern-day Syria, Egypt, the Arabian Gulf, and should also extend north to the Litani River in southern Lebanon. Lying 20 miles north of Lebanon’s southern border, the river is about 108 miles long and serves as Lebanon’s main source of water.

This position was reaffirmed again in 1919 when a delegation of the Zionist Organization, led by Chaim Weizmann, presented the case of a Jewish homeland in Palestine at the Paris Peace Conference that concluded World War I. The organization argued that such a state should start from the southern city of Saida and include the Litani River.

Instead, Great Britain and France were granted control of administering the formerly Ottoman-ruled land of Greater Syria and Palestine, which were put under an international legal charter called the mandate system.

Lebanon’s current borders date back to Sept. 1, 1920, when the French mandate recognized the nation’s territory stretching south to the cities of Saida and Tyre and below the Litani River to the boundaries of British-administered Mandatory Palestine.

Land borders dispute since 1948

The creation of the state of Israel in 1948, which led to the mass displacement of over 750,000 Palestinians and a subsequent Arab-Israeli war in 1948, led to a further shifting of borders in the region. In Lebanon, Israel occupied and annexed seven southern villages.

In 1949, under the aegis of the United Nations, Israel and Lebanon agreed to an Armistice Demarcation Line based on the 1923 Palestine-Lebanon boundaries set by the French and British colonial powers.

Though not a mutual agreement on statehood, the armistice was nonetheless a recognition of land borders. While never officially revoked, the armistice was, in practice, superseded by a borders shift during the Six Day War in 1967. That’s when Israel stopped recognizing all armistice agreements it had signed in 1949, including with Lebanon, even though the country wasn’t a party to the 1967 war.

In 1978, following a series of attacks organized by Palestinian fighters from Lebanese soil, Israel invaded Lebanon and occupied its south in what was known as Operation Litani. Israeli troops withdrew more than two decades later on May 25, 2000.

Thereafter, the U.N. established the Blue Line – a so-called withdrawal line to separate the two countries, absent mutually recognized borders – and put in the buffer zone a U.N. peacekeeping mission.

War for natural resources

But the border question was never settled, and the discovery of the Leviathan field in 2010 – the largest natural gas reservoir in the Mediterranean Sea – added a wrinkle in the form of a potential maritime dispute.

In October 2022, Israel and Lebanon signed a U.S.-brokered maritime border agreement, a move some analysts interpreted as the beginning of normalizing relations between the two countries.

However, the long-running land dispute has never been settled.

For the most part, the vocal far-right in Israel calling for expansion of the country’s border to the Litani River dress their claims in religious language – and what it might mean for security for Israel’s northern residents. But extending to the Litani would also provide a potential new source of water for a country with limited natural water sources and growing demand.

Lebanon’s fragile sovereignty

The lack of resolved borders and Israel’s periodic incursions into southern Lebanon have predictably meant that Lebanon has struggled to assert sovereignty over its own territory.

The 1985 birth of Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Shiite militia, following repeated Israeli invasions and amid the Lebanese civil war, only compounded matters.

Since then, Hezbollah has dominated the military scene inside Lebanon and repeatedly battled with Israel.

Tit-for-tat Hezbollah-Israel fighting following the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks escalated into a full-scale war in September 2024 in which over 3,000 Lebanese civilians were killed, 14,000 injured, and more than 1.2 million residents were displaced.

On Nov. 27, 2024, Israel and Hezbollah agreed to a ceasefire. However, this agreement was beset by mutual violations, including hundreds on the Israeli side.

It was finally derailed by the U.S. and Israeli war in Iran, Hezbollah’s subsequent retaliation, and Israel’s invasion.

Facing the magnitude of the war and the real threat of Israeli occupation, Lebanon banned Hezbollah’s military actions on its soil and expelled the Iranian ambassador from its territory.

But those moves have not satisfied those in Israel intent on full occupation of southern Lebanon.

The security risks of new Lebanon occupation

Including the current operation, Israel has invaded Lebanon seven times in the past 50 years.

Any potential plans for another long-term occupation would face many of the same risks as past endeavors – to both Lebanese and Israeli safety.

For one, Israel’s targeting and displacement of the Shiite community in southern Lebanon is likely to create friction among Lebanon’s various religious sects.

It could also degenerate into another wave of violence outside Lebanon. The internal destabilization of Lebanon has rarely been contained within the country, and in the past it has spread to neighboring countries – something that Israel’s northern residents and security officials are all too aware of.

Second, following yearslong conflict in Gaza, operations in Syria and now war with Iran, Israel’s military may be too stretched to achieve full occupation, even if that were the plan. Addressing the Israeli security cabinet, Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir said the “IDF is on the verge of collapse.”

There is also a sizable Israeli opposition to war in Lebanon and war fatigue within Israeli society.

Neither of those things may be enough to stop a long-term Israeli presence in south Lebanon, but it may help explain the ongoing narrative shifts from Israeli officials that in recent weeks have gone from creating a buffer zone in south Lebanon to full-scale occupation and control up to the Litani River.

There is no doubt that the fate of Hezbollah depends largely on the longer-term settlement of the Iran war and its effect on the associated operation in Lebanon’s south.

But Israel faces headwinds not favorable to full occupation: dwindling international support, internal tensions, entanglements in war across the region and potential violence inside Lebanon. Moreover, history shows that it is a risky endeavor – with high potential to backfire.

– ref. Israeli threats to occupy or annex south Lebanon dust off a decades-old playbook – https://theconversation.com/israeli-threats-to-occupy-or-annex-south-lebanon-dust-off-a-decades-old-playbook-279704

Evening Report: https://eveningreport.nz/2026/04/09/israeli-threats-to-occupy-or-annex-south-lebanon-dust-off-a-decades-old-playbook-279704/

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Wayne State University

Bipartisan calls for President Donald Trump’s removal from office increased on April 7, 2026, after he issued threats to destroy “a whole civilization” if Iran refuses to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

These calls have come from across the political spectrum, from Democratic Reps. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York and Melanie Stansbury of New Mexico to former Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene and right-wing pundit Alex Jones. Unlikely allies seem to agree that the president has gone too far and needs to be reined in.

Their concerns have emerged as Iran has walked away from talks to end the war and Trump’s language suggests that he plans to escalate it by destroying the country’s power plants and bridges.

Concerns over Trump’s fitness for office have grown in recent weeks as his commentary has become more erratic.

If lawmakers do attempt to remove Trump from office, here’s what would happen:

25th Amendment

The Constitution’s 25th Amendment provides a way for high-level officials to remove a president from office. It was ratified in 1967 in the wake of the 1963 assassination of John F. Kennedy – who was succeeded by Lyndon Johnson, who had already had one heart attack – as well as delayed disclosure of health problems experienced by Kennedy’s predecessor, Dwight Eisenhower.

The 25th Amendment provides detailed procedures on what happens if a president resigns, dies in office, has a temporary disability or is no longer fit for office.

It has never been invoked against a president’s will, and has been used only to temporarily transfer power, such as when a president is undergoing a medical procedure requiring anesthesia.

Section 4 of the 25th Amendment authorizes high-level officials – either the vice president and a majority of the Cabinet or another body designated by Congress – to remove a president from office without his consent when he is “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.” Congress has yet to designate an alternative body, and scholars disagree over the role, if any, of acting Cabinet officials.

The high-level officials simply send a written declaration to the president pro tempore of the Senate – the longest-serving senator from the majority party – and the speaker of the House of Representatives, stating that the president is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. The vice president immediately assumes the powers and duties of the president.

The president, however, can fight back. He or she can seek to resume their powers by informing congressional leadership in writing that they are fit for office and no disability exists. But the president doesn’t get the presidency back just by saying this.

The high-level officials originally questioning the president’s fitness then have four days to decide whether they disagree with the president. If they notify congressional leadership that they disagree, the vice president retains control and Congress has 48 hours to convene to discuss the issue. Congress has 21 days to debate and vote on whether the president is unfit or unable to resume his powers.

The vice president remains the acting president until Congress votes or the 21-day period lapses. A two-thirds majority vote by members of both houses of Congress is required to remove the president from office. If that vote fails or does not happen within the 21-day period, the president resumes his powers immediately.

The case for impeachment

Article II of the Constitution authorizes Congress to impeach and remove the president – and other federal officials – from office for “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” The founders included this provision as a tool to punish a president for misconduct and abuses of power. It’s one of the many ways that Congress could keep the president in check, if it chose to.

Impeachment proceedings begin in the House of Representatives. A member of the House files a resolution for impeachment. The resolution goes to the House Judiciary Committee, which usually holds a hearing to evaluate the resolution. If the House Judiciary Committee thinks impeachment is proper, its members draft and vote on articles of impeachment. Once the House Judiciary Committee approves articles of impeachment, they go to the full House for a vote.

If the House of Representatives impeaches a president or another official, the action then moves to the Senate. Under the Constitution’s Article I, the Senate has the responsibility for determining whether to remove the person from office. Normally, the Senate holds a trial, but it controls its procedures and can limit the process if it wants.

Ultimately, the Senate votes on whether to remove the president – which requires a two-thirds majority, or 67 senators. To date, the Senate has never voted to remove a president from office, although it almost did in 1868, when President Andrew Johnson escaped removal from office by one vote.

The Senate also has the power to disqualify a public official from holding public office in the future. If the person is convicted and removed from office, only then can senators vote on whether to permanently disqualify that person from ever again holding federal office. Members of Congress proposing the impeachment of Trump have promised to include a provision to do so. A simple majority vote is all that’s required then.

This is an updated version of an article originally published on Jan. 9, 2021.

– ref. When a president is unfit for office, here’s what the Constitution says can happen – https://theconversation.com/when-a-president-is-unfit-for-office-heres-what-the-constitution-says-can-happen-280120

Evening Report: https://eveningreport.nz/2026/04/09/when-a-president-is-unfit-for-office-heres-what-the-constitution-says-can-happen-280120/

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By John Hawkins, Head, Canberra School of Government, University of Canberra

Journalism is sometimes called the first draft of history. Near contemporary works, such as the University of Canberra’s long running series of books on Australian governments, going back to the Hawke government (1983-1991), might be viewed as the second draft.

Gold Standard? Remembering the Hawke Government differs from both. The book is timely. Edited by eminent academics Frank Bongiorno, Carolyn Holbrook and Joshua Black, it has been produced while it is still possible to have many chapters written by authors who observed the government in action, and some by those who worked in or for it.

But it can also assess the actions of the Hawke government from a distance, knowing its longer term consequences. It can compare the government to its successors, not just its predecessors.

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Review: Gold Standard? Remembering the Hawke Government – edited by Frank Bongiorno, Carolyn Holbrook and Joshua Black (NewSouth)

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Gareth Evans, who served as minister for foreign affairs, was the first to apply the term “gold standard” to the Hawke government. The book’s title adds a question mark, but most of the contributors seem to agree that the Hawke government was indeed the “gold standard”. Glyn Davis, in his preface, wonders whether “nostalgia has softened judgement”.

Gold Standard? is certainly less critical than some evaluations, such as those by political historians Graham Maddox and Dean Jaensch, both of whom criticise the government for its alleged betrayal of Labor traditions.

The book is nevertheless a more objective account than Hawke’s 1994 autobiography, which the editors describe as “the product of the overgrown ego of an embittered former leader”.

Hawke, his cabinet and his opponents

Hawke is the Australian Labor Party’s most electorally successful leader. Ian McPhee, a Liberal contemporary, recalls him as “intelligent, practical and charming”. But Hawke was an unusual mix as a person.

His interests were sporting, rather than cultural or intellectual. He could be quick-tempered. He was a womaniser and a heavy drinker (though he abstained while serving as prime minister). And he had a competitive streak. Michelle Grattan relates the story of Hawke signing up Australian cricketing great Rod Marsh as a special advisor, just so Marsh could play in the prime minister’s team in an exhibition match against the press gallery.

Hawke had undoubted strengths as a leader. Grattan, whose time in the press gallery predates the Hawke era, recalls it as a time when television was supreme as the public’s source of information on political events. This was a medium in which Hawke was very much at home.

He was not only popular; he possessed what the 19th century English journalist Walter Bagehot referred to as the desirable attributes of a statesperson: “common opinions and uncommon abilities”.

He was an accomplished chair of cabinet. Journalist Troy Bramston – Hawke biographer and co-editor of an earlier book on the government – explains how Hawke ably managed his government by not micromanaging it. “I allowed ministers their heads,” Hawke is quoted as saying, “not least because they had good heads.”

Hawke learned lessons from observing the unwieldy 27-member cabinet of Gough Whitlam. When Whitlam’s ministers lost an argument in cabinet, they would sometimes try to have the decision overruled by caucus. Hawke had a cabinet of 13 senior ministers, assisted by 14 junior ministers, and they were much more disciplined.

He inherited a strong ministerial team from Bill Hayden, who had picked up 13 seats at the 1980 election, putting Labor within striking distance of government. Hayden’s political and policy contribution has been underestimated.

Hawke was luckier than previous Labor prime ministers in the external environment. Andrew Fisher faced the first world war. James Scullin had to deal with the Great Depression. John Curtin and Ben Chifley governed during the second world war. Whitlam was prime minister during the OPEC oil shock. Hawke benefited from the breaking of a drought and a generally benign global economy.

Like Robert Menzies in the 1950s and Anthony Albanese now, Hawke was also lucky to face an opposition in disarray and riven by leadership rivalry. The Liberal Party had been in government with their coalition partners the Country/National Party from 1949 to 1972, and again from 1975 to 1983. Academic Marija Taflaga shows just how unprepared Hawke’s opponents were for their wilderness years.

Opposition leader Andrew Peacock campaigned well in 1984, but the swing he gained was not enough to bring him to government. The campaign of his rival John Howard in 1987 was derailed by the ludicrous “Joh for PM” campaign by Queensland premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen. In 1990, Peacock again increased the coalition’s two-party vote to just over 50%, but was thwarted by Labor’s astute preference-attracting strategy.

Holbrook and Bongiorno both suggest that the coalition’s opposition to Medicare contributed to its losses.

Assessing the policy record

Andrew Podger, a former public servant, describes the Hawke government’s reforms to the public service. Most of these were pragmatic and incremental. They made government more responsive, open and efficient. Podger laments, however, that there came to be “unduly high expectations of responsiveness”. With less secure tenure, senior public servants may tell ministers what they want to hear rather than what they need to hear,

Economist Bruce Chapman, with some help from former ACTU secretary Bill Kelty, examines the Hawke government’s macroeconomic record, explaining the role of the accord with the trade union movement. Developed by Hawke’s minister for industrial relations Ralph Willis, this involved wage restraint in exchange for improvements in the social wage. Chapman’s judgement is that it significantly lowered the unemployment rate.

Poltical historian Liam Byrne further discusses the accord. While the unions have influenced subsequent Labor governments, there has been no repeat of the accord. One reason may be that the share of the workforce belonging to a union has dropped from around half in 1983 to only around one in eight now.

This is largely a matter of structural change. The heavily unionised manufacturing sector is now a smaller proportion of the economy. But the reduced role of unions in winning wage rises under the accord may also have contributed.

Chapman was the designer of the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS), an income-contingent loan scheme by which students contributed to the cost of their university education, without being deterred by upfront fees. This Hawke government policy was internationally influential. But as former Labor leader turned university vice-chancellor Bill Shorten recently commented, “the higher education system has moved from a situation in 1990 where the government would pay 90% of a student’s course to now, on average, below 50%”.

Taflaga calls out the “mythology of bipartisan economic reform”. Evans also describes this as a “fantasy”. Whatever the coalition said later, it opposed many of the Hawke government’s reforms at the time, including the establishment of Medicare, compulsory superannuation and tax reforms, such as the introduction of fringe benefits tax and capital gains tax.

The task of economic reform was, however, made easier by a more serious media. Grattan observes that, during the Hawke era, senior public servants would give the media “background briefings” to explain how policy worked. Treasurer Paul Keating “was able to weave policy into a story”, accompanied by diagrams on a whiteboard.

Many reforms, dramatic at the time, now seem uncontroversial. As the editors comment, “no one today advocates for fixed exchange rates and few support a return to high tariffs”. But in some areas, such as education, corporatisation may have gone too far. The editors voice concern about “the galloping wealth inequality that took off in the 1980s”, which market reforms may have exacerbated: “nobody on the Labor side of politics today – not even Paul Keating himself – would argue as enthusiastically for the role of market forces as Keating did during the mid-1980s heyday of reformist energy”.

Economist Meredith Edwards emphasises that innovative social reforms were implemented in a context of fiscal restraint. Ministers wanting to spend more, or introduce new programs, had to find equivalent savings in others. Edwards regards the government’s child support scheme, like HECS, as world leading. It used the tax office to collect payments from non-custodial parents. She commends the government for its implementation of evidence-based policy. Political scientist Marian Sawer similarly attributes a good record on women’s policy to preparatory work by minister Susan Ryan.

Academic and Yawuru man Peter Yu, on the other hand, assesses that the Hawke government delivered little for First Nations Australians, other than establishing ATSIC.

Omissions

While Gold Standard? covers many areas, there are some lacunae. It surprised me there was no chapter on foreign policy. Hayden and Evans made important contributions as foreign ministers. The foreign affairs department was merged with the trade department. A ban on mining in Antarctica was implemented. Asia Pacific Economic Co-Operation (APEC) – “four adjectives in search of a noun”, as Evans quipped at the time – and the Cairns Group of trading nations were established.

Australia developed closer relations with Asia. Its role as a middle power, something of great contemporary resonance, blossomed.

Gold Standard? also gives less attention to some missteps. Davis refers briefly to the Australia Card as “an idea whose time swiftly came and went”. The 1990s recession and the MX missile crisis are barely mentioned.

The concluding chapter is contributed by Evans. He attributes the government’s success to the leadership and communication skills of Hawke and Keating, and the clear policy direction. The government was, he argues, “very dry in our economic policy, very compassionately moist in our social policy and very liberal internationalist in our foreign policy”.

Evans judges that the subsequent Labor governments of Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard “struggled to recreate anything as compelling”. The government of Anthony Albanese, who has cited Hawke as a role model, is still a work in progress.

– ref. Was the Hawke government really the ‘gold standard’ for reform? – https://theconversation.com/was-the-hawke-government-really-the-gold-standard-for-reform-277505

Evening Report: https://eveningreport.nz/2026/04/09/was-the-hawke-government-really-the-gold-standard-for-reform-277505/

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Bamo Nouri, Honorary Research Fellow, Department of International Politics, City St George’s, University of London

Ceasefires are often presented as moments of relief – pauses in violence that open the door to diplomacy. But sometimes they reveal something more consequential: who has actually gained from the war. The emerging ceasefire between the US, Israel and Iran may be one of those moments.

On the surface, all sides are claiming success. Donald Trump has declared a “total and complete victory”, presenting the agreement as evidence that US objectives have been met. Meanwhile, Iran’s leadership has framed the ceasefire as a strategic achievement, with its Supreme National Security Council formally endorsing the deal on the condition that attacks stop.

But beneath these competing narratives lies a deeper reality: the content and structure of the ceasefire suggests that Iran may have emerged not weakened, but strengthened. While much of its senior leadership has been assassinated during the conflict, the regime’s ability to rapidly appoint replacements and maintain cohesion points to institutional resilience rather than collapse.

The ceasefire was not imposed by decisive military defeat. It was negotiated – and shaped – around Iranian conditions, delivering gains it previously did not have, with Tehran’s ten-point plan serving as a starting framework for negotiations rather than a finalised agreement being imposed on Iran.

Tehran’s proposals went beyond ending hostilities. They include sanctions relief, access to frozen assets, reconstruction support and continued influence over the Strait of Hormuz. They also include effective US withdrawal from the Middle East – and an end to Israeli attacks on Lebanon.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil transits, has been reopened under Iranian oversight, a clear signal of where leverage now lies. Control over Hormuz is not just strategic but economic. Iran has reportedly proposed continuing the charging of transit fees it begin during the conflict – creating a potential revenue stream at precisely the moment reconstruction is needed.

In effect, a war that involved sustained bombing of Iranian infrastructure may now leave Iran with new financial mechanisms to rebuild and potentially expand its regional influence.

The logic is paradoxical but familiar. Military campaigns are designed to degrade an opponent’s capabilities. But when they fail to produce decisive political outcomes, they often create new opportunities for the targeted state. Iran entered this war already adapted to pressure. Years of sanctions had forced it to build resilience by diversifying networks, strengthening institutions and developing asymmetric strategies.

What the war appears to have done is accelerate that process. Rather than collapsing, Iran has demonstrated its ability to disrupt global energy markets, absorb sustained strikes and force negotiations on terms that include economic concessions.

Illusion of victory

This is where the dissonance in US messaging becomes most visible. The US president may have framed the ceasefire as a “complete victory” but, tellingly, while the ceasefire deal will involve the temporary reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which has been the US president’s main demand in recent days, talks will centre on Iran’s ten-point plan rather than the original US 15-point plan, which centred on dismantling Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities.

The shift suggests an American search for an off-ramp. At the same time, Iran has maintained a consistent position: rejecting temporary arrangements unless they deliver structural outcomes such as sanctions relief and security guarantees.

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Read more: Iran war: the search for an ‘off ramp’

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For Washington the ceasefire halts escalation and stabilises markets. For Tehran, it aims to consolidate the leverage offered by its control of the Strait of Hormuz. This asymmetry suggests the ceasefire is not a neutral pause, but a moment that could lock in a shift in regional power.

The most decisive dimension of this shift is economic. The war has destabilised global markets – with oil prices fluctuating sharply in response to disruptions of supply. But the ceasefire introduces a new dynamic. If sanctions are eased, Iran gains access to global markets at a time of sustained energy demand. Combined with potential transit revenues and reconstruction flows, this creates the conditions for a significant economic rebound.

In effect, the war risks producing the opposite of its intended outcome. Rather than weakening Iran economically, it may instead have strengthened it.

A stronger Iran, a weaker order?

This raises a larger question: what does this ceasefire reveal about power itself? For decades, US influence in the Middle East has rested on military dominance and economic pressure. This conflict suggests both are under strain.

Militarily, the US and Israel have demonstrated overwhelming capability, yet without decisive outcomes. Iran has retained its core capacities, maintained cohesion and leveraged its position to shape deescalation.

At the same time, US and Israeli legitimacy has eroded. The war’s contested justification, civilian toll and lack of broad international support have weakened their standing, even among allies. American soft power – long central to its global leadership – is diminished. Trump’s increasingly abusive social media posts have certainly alienated even its closest allies, most of whom stayed silent in face of US threats.

Economically, Iran’s ability to influence – and potentially monetise – global energy flows gives it a form of structural power that force alone cannot neutralise. The result is a paradox: a war intended to contain Iran may have reinforced its strength.

It is still early. Ceasefires can collapse, negotiations can fail, and conflicts can reignite. But if this agreement holds – even temporarily – it may mark a turning point. Not because it ends the war, but because of what it reveals about how wars are now won and lost. Victory is no longer defined by battlefield dominance alone, but by outcomes that are economically sustainable, politically legitimate and strategically durable.

On those measures, Iran appears well positioned. The US and Israel may have demonstrated military superiority. But Iran has demonstrated something different: the ability to endure, adapt and convert pressure into leverage.

That’s why this ceasefire matters; not just as an end to a phase of conflict, but marking the moment when a war intended to weaken Iran instead left it stronger – and exposed the limits of the power that sought to contain it.

– ref. Middle East conflict: this ceasefire may have made Iran stronger – https://theconversation.com/middle-east-conflict-this-ceasefire-may-have-made-iran-stronger-280164

Evening Report: https://eveningreport.nz/2026/04/09/middle-east-conflict-this-ceasefire-may-have-made-iran-stronger-280164/