Source: Radio New Zealand
By Graeme Acton, Asia Media Centre
This week’s 11th Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi decided to take the Taiwan Strait issue seriously. GREG BAKER/AFP
If China decides to attack Taiwan, what exactly does the rest of the world do? Graeme Acton is at the 2026 Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi.
It’s the kind of question that diplomatic forums sometimes avoid. However, this week’s 11th Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi decided to take the Taiwan Strait issue seriously, first session, second day.
A panel of five experts took the stage, and warned that the scope of simultaneous conflicts across the globe is widening in ways that stress-test the architecture of deterrence and diplomacy – with much of that stress seemingly by design.
Washington’s policy of strategic ambiguity – deliberately leaving unclear whether it would militarily defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack – has long provided a kind of managed uncertainty that has kept Beijing cautious.
But the “might is right” ethos of American power under the current administration, combined with its scepticism toward long-standing commitments and international norms, has eroded the credibility that US ambiguity once traded upon.
Simultaneously, Beijing has grown more, not less, vehement in its insistence on what it calls “reunification”.
Experts at Raisina 2026 argued that the ongoing conflict in Iran is no longer a regional affair but one that is “bleeding together” with security concerns across the Indo-Pacific. Dhruva Jaishankar, Executive Director of ORF America, pointed to the expanding reach of Iranian missile and drone capabilities – including strikes on a British military base in Cyprus – as evidence of this widening arc of instability.
Indian commentators are obviously also concerned about the sinking of an Iranian warship off the coast of Sri Lanka just a few days ago. The ship had just been on exercises with the Indian navy, and PM Modi has been roundly criticised in Indian media for his silence to date on the issue.
The risk, Raisina panellists argued, is that Beijing sees American engagement in Iran Asia as a window of opportunity. Bonnie Glick of the Foundation for Defence of Democracies pushed back on that assessment, maintaining that Washington remains perfectly capable of dealing with multiple crises simultaneously and that its messaging on Taiwan stays firm. “I think China views bottom line American intervention in Iran right now as a moment for consideration of Taiwan,” she told the audience, but she also felt China has this moment to consider the consequences of dealing with a US administration quite happy to let loose the dogs of war under circumstances it regards as appropriate.
Helena Legarda of the Mercator Institute for Chinese Studies offered a more cautious European perspective. While acknowledging that Beijing might exploit other conflicts for “rhetorical ammunition,” she noted that this does not necessarily legitimise direct military action against Taiwan – partly because Beijing still wishes to present itself as a responsible global power.
But her assessment of Europe’s practical capacity to respond to a Taiwan crisis was sobering. If the war in Ukraine is still ongoing and Europe is managing that conflict largely alone, she said, it would be unlikely that EU member states could assemble the right military assets quickly enough for a standoff in the South China Sea.
Ms Legarda cut to the chase on what makes the Taiwan question so difficult: the world’s potential democratic responders are already stretched. Japan has adopted the firmest posture among US treaty allies, bolstered by a new defence pact with the Philippines.
But what Australia, New Zealand or South Korea would actually do in the event of a crisis -not rhetorically, but operationally – remains cloudy. All three nations have trade and economic ties with China that hugely complicate the situation.
From Taipei itself, I-Chung Lai of the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation offered his reading of China’s military readiness: China simply does not yet possess the capability to carry out a successful invasion of Taiwan.
Crossing the Taiwan Strait is one of the most complex military operations imaginable. You need to move tens of thousands of troops, armoured vehicles, and supplies across 150-200 km of open water, under fire, and then storm heavily defended beaches. But as Dhruva Jaishankar pointed out , China has been involved in extensive military exercises in the South China Sea, as much a signal to Taiwan as a process of military preparedness.
Some analysts suggest the Chinese Army (the PLA) just doesn’t have the resources necessary at present. Add to this the fact that Taiwan has just signed off on the largest defence budget in its history – roughly $US40 billion to be spent from 2026 to 2033 – focused on asymmetric warfare capabilities including munitions designed to cripple amphibious landing forces at long range
I-Chung Lai also mentioned the concept of “Pax Silica.”, the peace maintained by the understanding that global chip makers would be devastated if Taiwan’s giant semiconductor factories went down. The disruption to supply chains – from cars to laptops to AI infrastructure would be massive on all sides of the conflict. In 2025 the US moved to set up a network of “trusted chip suppliers” – India joined that group last month.
But despite the chip issue, Beijing’s signals around Taiwan remain clear, and the recent invasion of Ukraine shows that sometimes nations will act against their economic interests while chasing their strategic objectives.
What Raisina 2026 made clear is that the comfortable old framework – American strategic ambiguity underpinning a reasonably stable cross-strait status quo – is fraying. The burden of deterrence is being redistributed across a coalition whose cohesion, resolve, and actual capacity vary enormously.
For New Zealand’s part, the three AUKUS founding members (US, UK, Australia) have themselves said they are “not yet in a position to consider expanding to additional partners” – meaning New Zealand hasn’t been formally offered a military “Pillar Two” membership.
But New Zealand’s recent Defence Capability Plan, released nearly a year ago, proposes investments in long-range drones, satellite surveillance, data integration, and counter-drone technologies that closely mirror the priorities seen in AUKUS.
New Zealand also maintains its own ambiguity on the Taiwan question -arguably edging closer to the alliance without triggering Beijing’s red lines –or the New Zealand public’s nuclear-free sensitivities and marked hesitancy about fighting other people’s wars.
The question is not simply whether anyone will come to Taiwan’s defence. It is whether the network of interests, alliances, economic interdependencies, and democratic solidarity that constitutes the current world order can commit and act quickly enough, and firmly enough, to make Beijing reconsider an assault on the island.
-Asia Media Centre
– Published by EveningReport.nz and AsiaPacificReport.nz, see: MIL OSI in partnership with Radio New Zealand
LiveNews: https://nz.mil-osi.com/2026/03/09/raisina-the-taiwan-strait-issue/
